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Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented 
Approach to Judicial Recusal 
Amanda Frost* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The laws governing judicial recusal are failing at one of their pri-
mary objectives: protecting the reputation of the judiciary.  The problems 
with the recusal process were front and center during the recent contro-
versy surrounding Justice Antonin Scalia’s decision to sit on Cheney v. 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia1 despite having 
vacationed with Vice President Richard Cheney shortly after the Su-
preme Court agreed to hear the case.  Whatever one’s opinion about 
whether Justice Scalia should have recused himself, most would agree 
that the manner in which the issue entered public debate and then was 
decided—beginning with front-page news stories about the trip, followed 
by Congressional inquiries, editorials calling for his recusal, a rash of po-
litical cartoons, and ending with Scalia’s remarkable 21-page memoran-
dum decision defending his decision to sit on the case—injured the repu-
tation of the judiciary. 
At the end of the day, two competing versions of the Scalia-Cheney 
vacation emerged.  Those who think Scalia should have recused himself 
note that he and members of his family traveled together on the Vice 
President’s plane, at government expense, and then spent several days in 
an intimate setting where the two would have had ample opportunity to 
discuss a case in which the Vice President’s reputation was at stake.  
Those who think recusal was unwarranted point out that Scalia and his 
family bought round-trip airline tickets and thus did not save any money 
                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.  I wish to 
thank Richard Fallon, John Leubsdorf, Laura Rosenbury, John Sharretts, Brian Wolfman, and David 
Zaring, as well as the faculty at American University Washington College of Law, for helpful com-
ments on drafts of this Article.  I also note that I was an attorney at Public Citizen Litigation Group 
at the time that Alan Morrison, another Litigation Group attorney, served as counsel of record for 
Sierra Club in Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  However, I did 
not participate in that litigation, and this Article reveals no confidential information and reflects no 
one’s views but my own. 
 1. 541 U.S. 913 (2004). 
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by traveling with Cheney; note that the suit was brought against the Vice 
President in only his official, and not his personal, capacity; and rely on 
Scalia’s assurances that the two never spoke about the case or even were 
alone together during the trip. 
Central to the debate was not just whether Justice Scalia would in 
fact be biased in Cheney’s favor as a result of their social contact, but 
also whether the trip would create the appearance that he might be.  The 
federal law’s requirement that a judge recuse himself when his “imparti-
ality” might “reasonably be questioned” creates an objective standard for 
evaluating partiality, meaning that a judge should recuse himself not only 
in cases where he is actually biased, but also in cases where the facts and 
circumstances could create that appearance.2  Congress intended judges 
to recuse themselves in such cases so that “justice satisfies the appear-
ance of justice,” which will in turn “promote public confidence in the in-
tegrity of the judicial process.”3  Appearances matter because the judici-
ary’s reputation is essential to its institutional legitimacy—that is, to the 
public’s respect for and willingness to abide by judicial decisionmaking.  
Indeed, scholars of the federal court system suggest that the public’s per-
ception of the judiciary’s independence and integrity is the primary 
source of its legitimacy, and ultimately its power.4 
The furor over whether Justice Scalia should have recused himself 
from the Cheney case demonstrates that recusal law has not succeeded in 
protecting the judiciary’s reputation.  This is not the first time that the ju-
dicial branch has been criticized for its application of the laws governing 
judicial recusal and disqualification.5  On many occasions during the past 
200 years the public has focused on a judge’s questionable decision not 
                                                     
 2. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (“[W]hat matters is not the 
reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.”). 
 3. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (citing S. REP. NO. 
93-419, at 5 (1973); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974)); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (stating that 
the goal of legislation is to “promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process”); 
see also United States v. Hollister, 746 F.2d 420, 425–26 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Avoiding the appearance 
of impropriety is as important to developing public confidence in the judiciary as avoiding impropri-
ety itself.”). 
For an interesting discussion of the difficulty of disentangling concerns over the “appearance of 
justice” from actual injustice, see Note, Satisfying the “Appearance of Justice”: The Uses of Appar-
ent Impropriety in Constitutional Adjudication, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2708, 2710–21 (2004). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II. 
 5. The terms “recusal” and “disqualification” have slightly different meanings.  “Recusal” 
refers to a judge’s voluntary decision to remove himself from a case, while “disqualification” refers 
to a statutorily mandated removal of a judge.  Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of 
Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 237 n.5 (1978).  However, the same 
standard governs recusal and disqualification under federal law.  Id.  The terms are used inter-
changeably in this Article. 
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to recuse and has found the laws governing that decision to be wanting.6  
Nor is it likely to be the last time that a judge makes an unpopular deci-
sion to remain on a case.  Even before the debate over Justice Scalia’s 
trip with the Vice President had died down, new concerns were being 
raised, both in the press and by members of Congress, about Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg’s connections to the National Organization for 
Women—an entity that frequently has cases before the Court.7 
This Article does not seek to answer the specific question whether 
Justice Scalia should have recused himself from the Cheney case, but 
rather uses that particular incident to illuminate the method by which 
such decisions should be made to best further the goal of protecting the 
reputation of the judiciary.  How should the facts and arguments in favor 
of or against recusal be discovered, particularly when it is usually the 
judge, not the parties, who has first-hand knowledge of the circum-
stances?  Should the opinions of editorial writers, pundits, and political 
cartoonists be taken into account?  If not, just whose opinion are judges 
supposed to consider when determining whether their impartiality might 
“reasonably be questioned”?  Finally, who gets to decide whether a judge 
or justice must be disqualified from sitting on a case—the very judicial 
officer whose impartiality is being questioned, or a neutral decision-
maker? 
Rather than answer these process-oriented questions, the academic 
literature has mainly focused on reforming the substantive standard for 
judicial disqualification.  With each new scandal or crisis has come a 
flurry of scholarship advocating an expansion of the grounds for dis-
qualification,8 and Congress has often responded by amending the 
                                                     
 6. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 7. Thirteen Republican members of Congress asked Justice Ginsburg to withdraw from all 
future cases concerning abortion after she agreed to loan her name and presence to the Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg Distinguished Lecture Series, which is co-sponsored by the NOW Legal Defense 
Fund.  GOP Lawmakers Ask Ginsburg to Withdraw from Abortion Cases, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
2004, at A18; see also Peter S. Canellos, Outspoken Justices Cloud High Court’s Appearance, BOS-
TON GLOBE, June 15, 2004, at A3 (criticizing Justice Ginsburg for allowing NOW to use her name 
for lecture series). 
 8. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 1213 (2002); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1970); Paul G. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and the 
Problem of Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 381 (1990); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal and 
Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589 (1987); Note, Disqualification of Federal District Judge for Bias—
The Standard Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749, 763–70 (1973) [hereinafter The Standard]; 
Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1446–47 
(1966) [hereinafter Bias in the Federal Courts]; Brian P. Leitch, Note, Judicial Disqualification in 
the Federal Courts: A Proposal to Conform Statutory Provisions to Underlying Policies, 67 IOWA L. 
REV. 525 (1982). 
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recusal laws as suggested.9  However, altering the substance of the 
recusal standard has proven to be an ineffective method of reforming this 
sensitive area of judicial self-governance.  As discussed in more detail 
below, history shows that each time the standard for recusal is broadened 
by Congress, it is narrowed soon thereafter as members of the judiciary 
apply it to themselves.10  The very self-dealing that makes recusals nec-
essary in the first place has operated to prevent disqualification statutes 
from being employed as fully and broadly as Congress intended.11  
Moreover, even when the recusal standards are vigorously applied, the ad 
hoc and informal processes by which the decision to disqualify is made 
undermines public confidence in the judiciary. 
In any case, it would be troubling to broaden the substantive standard 
for recusal to require judges to step down every time the public questions 
their impartiality.  In his memorandum defending his decision to remain 
on the Cheney case, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that he should 
recuse himself solely because dozens of editorial boards and political 
pundits had called for him to do so.12  That seems right.  Surely even 
unanimous cries for recusal by the media cannot govern such a politi-
cally sensitive question. 
In part, this is because the media may not be an accurate proxy for 
public opinion.  But even assuming that it could be demonstrated that the 
majority of citizens believed that a particular judge could not be impar-
tial, it is not clear as a matter of constitutional law or even just good pub-
lic policy that the judge should then automatically step aside.  To give 
the public such control is antithetical to the role federal judges are in-
tended to serve in the constitutional structure.  Judges are given life ten-
ure and salary protections not just so they can hold their own against the 
other two branches of government, but also so that they can take posi-
tions opposed by the majority of the public.  As Robert Bork put it, 
“[f]ederal judges, alone among our public officials, are given life tenure 
precisely so that they will not be accountable to the people.”13 
                                                     
 9. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGES § 23.1, at 672 (1996) (noting the federal judicial disqualification statute was amended “on 
multiple occasions; in each instance Congress enlarged the enumerated grounds for seeking disquali-
fication”). 
 10. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 11. The same phenomenon has undermined efforts to curb judicial contempt power.  See Eric 
Fleisig-Greene, Note, Why Contempt is Different: Agency Costs and “Petty Crime” in Summary 
Contempt Proceedings, 112 YALE L.J. 1223, 1251–52 (2003). 
 12. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004). 
 13. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 5 (1990).  Bork’s point echoes that of Alex-
ander Hamilton, who wrote that judicial independence is “an essential safeguard against the effects 
of occasional ill humors in the society.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton) 
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It is time to stop tinkering with the substantive standard for recusal, 
and instead to propose reforming the process by which the recusal deci-
sion is made.  The solution I offer is to incorporate into recusal law the 
core tenets of adjudication identified fifty years ago by Legal Process 
theorists as essential to maintaining the judiciary’s legitimacy—tenets 
that legal commentators continue to cite today as serving a vital legiti-
mating function.14  Chief among these are the adversarial system in 
which the parties present facts and arguments to an impartial judge, who 
then issues a reasoned explanation for her ruling. 
These elements of adjudication were not invented by Legal Process 
theorists; rather, this school of legal scholars described the basic attrib-
utes of adjudication that had long existed and then explained why these 
qualities legitimized the judiciary’s countermajoritarian role in a democ-
racy.  Even scholars who would not be described as Legal Process theo-
rists have recognized the value of using procedures to cabin judicial dis-
cretion and improve the quality of judicial decisionmaking.15  In 
addition, recent literature has observed that the traditional forms of adju-
dication described by the Legal Process school are also enshrined in the 
Constitution’s description of the judicial role and reflect the judiciary’s 
core competencies vis-à-vis the other branches of government.16 
Furthermore, judges should be especially careful to adhere to the tra-
ditional forms of adjudication when addressing sensitive questions that 
will affect the reputation of the judiciary.  Recusal laws are deeply con-
cerned with protecting the integrity of the judiciary, which is an impor-
tant element in maintaining the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking.17  
Thus, it is particularly appropriate to seek their fix in Legal Process 
methodology, which itself arose as a defense against the Legal Realist  
 
                                                                                                                       
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).  Hamilton further stated that the judiciary needed life tenure to ensure 
that it served as a bulwark against the vagaries of popular opinion: 
Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some 
way or other, be fatal to [judges’] necessary independence.  If the power of making them 
was committed . . . to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose, 
there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that noth-
ing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws. 
Id. at 502. 
 14. See discussion infra Part III. 
 15. See discussion infra Part II. 
 16. Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 32 
(2003) (describing how the characteristics of the judicial role described by Lon Fuller are also incor-
porated into the constitutional framework and reflect the judiciary’s institutional competence). 
 17. See infra notes 73−75 and accompanying text. 
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charge that adjudication is an undemocratic, and thus illegitimate, form 
of decisionmaking.18 
Ironically, the recusal process is unique in the degree to which it has 
eschewed the basic procedural elements that have been viewed as indis-
pensable to maintaining the legitimacy of adjudication.19  Unlike almost 
any other area of the law, the process by which judges decide whether to 
recuse themselves ignores the systems usually employed to resolve dis-
putes in a fair and impartial manner.  As a general matter, the recusal 
process is usually not adversarial, does not provide for a full airing of the 
relevant facts, is not bounded by a developed body of law, and often is 
not concluded by the issuance of a reasoned explanation for the judge’s 
decision.  Most importantly, the decision itself is almost always made in 
the first instance by the very judge being asked to disqualify himself, 
even though that judge has an obvious personal stake in the matter.  My 
contention is that it is this very ad hoc and informal process, rather than 
any problem with the substantive standards for recusal, which has led to 
the recurring dissatisfaction with the law. 
Part II of this Article describes the evolution of federal judicial dis-
qualification laws in the United States.  For two centuries the substantive 
standards for disqualification have continually been amended by Con-
gress in response to periodic controversial decisions by judges not to 
recuse themselves in high profile cases.  However, these laws are then 
narrowly construed by the judges who apply the legal standards to them-
selves, undermining Congressional intent to protect the reputation of the 
judiciary.  This history demonstrates that as long as judges decide recusal 
questions outside the boundaries of the traditional forms of adjudication, 
recusal law will not serve its intended legitimating function. 
Searching for a solution, Part III describes the traditional forms of 
adjudication lauded by Legal Process scholars, among others, as essential 
to legitimizing judicial decisionmaking.  At the core of the adjudicatory 
process is the conception that the parties must frame and present their 
dispute to a neutral decisionmaker who makes a reasoned decision cab-
                                                     
 18. Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in 
the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 619 (1991); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflec-
tions on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 970 (1994) (noting that the Legal 
Process school provided an answer to the problem of judicial subjectivity introduced by Legal Real-
ism); Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 693–95 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M. 
BATER ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1988)) 
(describing Legal Process theory as a response to Legal Realists’ critiques of judicial legitimacy). 
 19. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 
243 (1987) (noting that judges have more leeway to decide whether to recuse themselves than they 
have in other matters). 
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ined by existing law.  This Part, which is the normative heart of the Arti-
cle, explains how the presence of each of these elements legitimizes judi-
cial decisionmaking. 
Part IV describes how judicial disqualification operates in a proce-
dural vacuum that has prevented the disqualification laws from protect-
ing judicial integrity.  To illustrate the problem, Part IV describes the 
process (or rather, the lack thereof) accompanying the public disclosure 
of the Scalia-Cheney vacation and Justice Scalia’s decision to continue to 
sit on the Cheney case even after the respondent sought his disqualifica-
tion.  Using this recent controversy as its example, this Part explains how 
the absence of the traditional adjudicatory procedures in recusal law un-
dermines the reputation of the judiciary. 
Part V suggests reforms that would incorporate the traditional forms 
of adjudication into the recusal process.  Putting the theory into practice, 
I then return to the Cheney case and describe how the reforms suggested 
in this Article would have operated in the context of that case to better 
protect the reputation of the judiciary. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION LAW 
An impartial decisionmaker has always been considered an essential 
component of the Anglo-American legal system,20 as well as the legal 
systems of many other cultures.21  Yet despite this longstanding and 
                                                     
 20. See Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1 (1923) (describing the judicial 
obligation to recuse for bias or interest in medieval times).  The concept of recusal for interest is 
found in the Code of Justinian, which incorporates references to judicial recusal dating back to 530 
A.D.  Id. at 3, 3 n.10.  Putnam quotes the following passage (in translation) from the Code of Justin-
ian: 
It is the clearest right under general provisions laid down from thy exalted seat, that be-
fore hearings litigants may recuse judges . . . .  Although a judge has been appointed by 
imperial power yet because it is our pleasure that all litigations should proceed without 
suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who thinks the judge under suspicion to recuse him 
before issue joined, so that the cause go to another; the right to recuse having been held 
out to him . . . . 
Id. at 3 n.10; see also Schultz, A New Approach to Bracton, 2 SEMINAR 41, 42–50 (1944) (providing 
a history of medieval recusal practices). 
Lack of judicial independence was also one of the principal grievances listed in the Declaration 
of Independence, which complained that the king had “made judges dependent on his will alone, for 
the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.”  THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776). 
 21. For example, Roman Law adopted in Spain in the fourteenth century provided for recusal 
of judges for personal hostility.  Putnam, supra note 20, at 5–6.  The same law applied in the Span-
ish-speaking republics of South America.  Id. For other cultural examples, see Seth E. Bloom, Judi-
cial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 662, 662 (1985) (“One of the most fundamental and self-evident principles of any fair 
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near-universal principle, the rules establishing when a judge is disquali-
fied for interest or bias from hearing a dispute have varied widely over 
time and across jurisdictions.  Even today in the United States, recusal in 
the federal courts alone is governed by three overlapping statutes22 and 
by the Code of Judicial Conduct,23 all of which set out different standards 
and procedures for recusal.24  So, even though all agree that judges must 
recuse themselves under some circumstances, no uniform rule or proce-
dure for recusal exists. 
A.  The Origins of Judicial Disqualification Laws in the United States 
The development of the law of judicial disqualification in the United 
States has followed a recognizable pattern.  First, Congress sets the stan-
dard governing when judges must remove themselves from sitting on 
cases in which they are not able, or might not be able, to be impartial.  
That standard is then narrowly construed by the judges who must apply it 
to decide whether they themselves should be disqualified from a case.  
Eventually, a particularly egregious situation arises in which a judge sits 
on a case when most outside observers think that she should have 
stepped aside.  The situation comes to the attention of the press, the pub-
lic, and ultimately Congress, which amends the law to provide stiffer 
standards for recusal.  And then the whole process begins anew.25 
Although the concept of recusal was firmly established in English 
common law by the time the American judicial system was being devel-
oped, it was a pale version of the standard we embrace today.  The rule 
that “[n]o man shall be a judge in his own case” had been recognized in 
                                                                                                                       
system of justice is that judges must be neutral and impartial.”); R. P. Lamond, Of Interest as a Dis-
qualification in Judges, 23 SCOT. L. REV. 152, 152 (1907) (referencing English and Scottish cul-
tures). 
 22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, 455 (1998).  Sections 144 and 455 are discussed in detail below.  
Section 47 of Title 28 provides simply that “[n]o judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the 
decision of a case or issue tried by him.”  Because the application of this law has been straightfor-
ward and uncontroversial, it is not included in the discussion below. 
 23. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANNON 3 (1973).  This Canon was adopted by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States in 1973.  69 F.R.D. 273, 277–79 (1975). 
 24. All states have recusal statutes as well, but again, those statutes differ as to when a judge 
should recuse herself and how that decision is to be made.  A detailed discussion of the variations in 
state recusal laws is beyond the scope of this Article.  For a description of some of the state prac-
tices, see generally FLAMM, supra note 9; Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who 
Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543 (1994). 
 25. See Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 245 (alluding to this “vicious cycle”).  Books and articles 
describing high-profile refusals to recuse and subsequent congressional response include: JOHN P. 
MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE (1974); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 
YALE L.J. 605 (1947); Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 736 (1973) [hereinafter Disqualification]. 
LAWREVIEW.FROST.GALLEY.2.DOC 7/8/2005  2:32:12 PM 
2005] KEEPING UP APPEARANCES 539 
English law since at least the seventeenth century,26 but that potentially 
broad principle was limited in application, operating to disqualify judges 
from hearing only those cases in which they had a direct pecuniary inter-
est.27  Blackstone squarely rejected the idea that a judge should be pro-
hibited from hearing a case in which he might have a bias unrelated to 
financial gain or loss,28 and English courts followed Blackstone’s lead—
for example, by holding that a judge could sit on a case even though he 
was related to one of the parties.29 
Federal judges have always been held to a higher standard than the 
bare minimum required by English common law.  Within three years af-
ter the Constitution’s ratification, Congress passed the first recusal stat-
ute.  The Act of May 8, 1792, allowed federal district court judges to be 
disqualified if they had a financial interest in the litigation or had served 
as counsel to either party.30  But other than these specific grounds for 
disqualification for interest, the statute did not prohibit judges from hear-
ing cases in which they might have a bias or prejudice against or in favor 
of one of the parties.31 
                                                     
 26. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608) (Lord Coke ruled that members of a 
board that determined physicians’ qualifications could not both impose and personally receive 
fines.). 
 27. For example, the Mayor of Hereford was imprisoned for sitting in judgment in a cause 
where he had leased land from the plaintiff.  Putnam, supra note 20, at 4. 
 28. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361 (“the law will not suppose the possibility 
of bias or favor in a judge”). 
 29. Brooks v. Rivers, 1 Hardres 503, 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (1668) (stating that a judge was not 
required to recuse himself in his brother-in-law’s case, “for favour shall not be presumed in a 
judge”).  For a more detailed history of the origins of recusal standards in English common law and 
early American law, see Frank, supra note 25, at 609–26, and Putnam, supra note 20, at 9–14. 
 30. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278–79 (1792).  That statute provided: 
And be it further enacted, That in all suits and actions in any district court of the United 
States, in which it shall appear that the judge of such court is, any ways, concerned in in-
terest, or has been of counsel for either party, it shall be the duty of such judge on appli-
cation of either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the minutes of the court, and also 
to order an authenticated copy thereof, with all the proceedings in such suit or action, to 
be forthwith certified to the next circuit court of the district, which circuit court shall, 
thereupon, take cognizance thereof, in the like manner, as if it had been originally com-
menced in that court, and shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly. 
Id. 
 31. Early standards for recusal were far more lax than they are today.  Interestingly, Marbury v. 
Madison is an example of an early case in which a Justice chose not to recuse himself despite an 
obvious interest and involvement in the case.  5 U.S. 137 (1803).  Chief Justice John Marshall had 
been the Acting Secretary of State who had failed to deliver William Marbury’s commission to serve 
as Justice of the Peace.  Thus, in sitting on the case, Marshall judged the legality of a commission 
that he had authorized while a cabinet official, and which he admitted responsibility for failing to 
deliver.  MACKENZIE, supra note 25, at 1. 
In reviewing the multiple instances in which Justices ran for office, negotiated treaties, and 
committed themselves to other non-judicial tasks, one commentator wrote: “This is not a part of our 
history that guides us by its ethical example; it is a part that dramatizes how different we have be-
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The 1792 recusal statute was construed narrowly from its inception.32  
In defining improper judicial “interest,” courts adopted the restricted 
English common law standard and applied it sparingly.33  For example, 
in 1872 a federal judge presided over bankruptcy proceedings despite be-
ing a creditor of the bankrupt.34  Although the judge admitted that the 
matter raised a “question of delicacy” and put him in an “embarrassing 
position,” he nonetheless declined to recuse himself because he was 
“wholly unconscious of any bias” that could “warp [his] judgment.”35  
Courts also limited the 1792 Act’s requirement that a judge disqualify 
himself when he had previously represented a party, concluding that it 
applied only when the judge had been counsel in the very same case.36 
In the first of many amendments attempting to broaden the law’s 
scope, the statute was altered in 1821 to mandate more generally that a 
judge recuse himself if he is “so related to, or connected with, either 
party, as to render it improper for him, in his opinion, to sit on the trial of 
such suit or action.”37  Congress altered the statute again in 1911, adding 
that a judge should recuse himself if, “in his opinion,” his relationship 
with any attorney made it improper for the judge to sit on the case.38  In 
1948, the provision was recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 455, where it remains 
today.  The 1948 amendments eliminated the requirement that a party 
                                                                                                                       
come.”  Id. at 5–7. 
 32. Frank, supra note 25, at 627–28; Disqualification, supra note 25, at 740 (“Courts have 
tended to construe narrowly the mandatory grounds of section 455.”). 
 33. Frank, supra note 25, at 627. 
 34. In re Sime, 22 F. Cas. 145, 146 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (No. 12,861). 
 35. Id. at 146–47. 
 36. See Frank, supra note 25, at 627 (citing Carr v. Fife, 156 U.S. 494 (1895)) (“‘Has been of 
counsel’ was soon limited by addition of the phrase ‘in this case’ . . . .”). 
 37. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643.  That statute provided: 
That in all suits and actions in any district court of the United States, in which it shall ap-
pear that the judge of such court is any ways concerned in interest, or has been of counsel 
for either party, or is so related to, or connected with, either party, as to render it im-
proper for him, in his opinion, to sit on the trial of such suit or action, it shall be the duty 
of such judge, on application of either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the records 
of the court; and, also, an order that an authenticated copy thereof, with all the proceed-
ings in such suit or action, shall be forthwith certified to the next circuit court of the dis-
trict; and if there be no circuit court in such district, to the next circuit court in the state; 
and if there be no circuit court in such state, to the most convenient circuit court in an ad-
jacent state; which circuit court shall, upon such record being filed with the clerk thereof, 
take cognisance thereof, in the like manner as if such suit or action had been originally 
commenced in that court, and shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly; 
and the jurisdiction of such circuit court shall extend to all such cases so removed, as 
were cognisable in the district court from which the same was removed. 
Id. 
 38. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 20 (1992)). 
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first seek a judge’s disqualification, transforming the statute from a chal-
lenge-for-cause provision to a self-enforcing disqualification provision 
that places the onus on the judge to determine whether he should recuse 
himself.39 
Judges applying the amended statute to themselves once again found 
ways to limit its reach.  “The specific mandatory grounds for disqualifi-
cation were narrowly construed” by courts.40  In addition, judges created 
the “duty to sit” doctrine—that is, an obligation to remain on any case to 
which they had been assigned absent statutory grounds for recusal—that 
nowhere appears in the statute.41  Theoretically, the “duty to sit” does not 
conflict with the statutory requirement that judges recuse themselves un-
der certain specific circumstances.  But the statutory standard for dis-
qualification is vague, leading to ambiguous situations in which reason-
able people can differ about whether the judge has a disqualifying 
interest.  Because the legal obligation to recuse is not always clear, the 
“duty to sit” doctrine encouraged judges to remain on cases from which 
they arguably should have recused themselves.42 
Early dissatisfaction with the law spurred Congress to enact a second 
recusal statute in 1911 that for the first time provided a means for liti-
gants to seek disqualification of a judge not just for a conflict of interest, 
but also for more general bias or prejudice that might prevent the judge 
from serving as a neutral decisionmaker.43  Although the new law—
                                                     
 39. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 869, 908 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.  
§ 455 (1992)).  The statute provides: 
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he 
has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so 
related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opin-
ion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein. 
Id. 
In addition to eliminating the requirement that a party seek disqualification, the 1948 amend-
ments added the word “substantial” before interest—one of the only occasions in which Congress 
narrowed a recusal statute. 
 40. Litteneker, supra note 5, at 239. 
 41. Id.  Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (noting that the courts of appeals had unani-
mously concluded that judges have “a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as 
the duty to not sit where disqualified”). 
 42. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 717 (D. Idaho 1981) (noting that “duty to sit” doctrine 
led to judges refusing to recuse in “difficult” cases); Litteneker, supra note 5, at 239 (same). 
 43. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090.  The statute provided: 
Sec. 21.  Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and 
file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or 
heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party 
to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be desig-
nated in the manner prescribed in the section last preceding, or chosen in the manner pre-
scribed in section twenty-three, to hear such matter.  Every such affidavit shall state the 
facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not 
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codified today as 28 U.S.C. § 144—established a more liberal standard 
for recusal, it applied only to district court judges and thus could not be 
used to disqualify judges on the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court, 
as § 455 can. 
In addition to creating a broader standard for recusal of trial judges, 
the statute sought to limit judicial discretion about when to recuse.  Sec-
tion 144 permits either party to force the disqualification of a federal dis-
trict judge by filing an affidavit alleging facts from which the judge’s 
bias or prejudice reasonably may be inferred.44  The legislative history 
explains that judges are to be automatically disqualified from any case in 
which such an affidavit is filed, even if they disagree with the claimed 
basis for disqualification.45  Specifically, the statute provides: 
 
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, 
shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the 
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or 
prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party to  
 
                                                                                                                       
less than ten days before the beginning of the term of the court, or good cause shall be 
shown for the failure to file it within such time.  No party shall be entitled in any case to 
file more than one such affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied 
by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are made in good 
faith.  The same proceedings shall be had when the presiding judge shall file with the 
clerk of the court a certificate that he deems himself unable for any reason to preside with 
absolute impartiality in the pending suit or action. 
Id. 
 44. Id.  The affidavit must be from the party him or herself and must be accompanied by a cer-
tificate from counsel that it has been made in good faith.  Parties are limited to one affidavit per case 
and must file it within a specified period of time.  Although as originally written the law appeared to 
apply to all judges, early on it was construed as applying only to trial courts.  See Kinney v. Ply-
mouth Rock Squab Co., 213 Fed. 449, 449 (1914) (stating that the statute “is so framed that evi-
dently it does not apply to an appellate tribunal”). 
 45. See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 25.2.1, at 721 (“On its face § 144 appears to be a peremptory 
disqualification provision, and there is little doubt that it was originally intended to be one.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
During debate over the legislation, Rep. Cullop of Indiana was asked whether district courts had 
discretion under the statute to determine whether affidavits were sufficient to justify their disqualifi-
cation. 
Mr. Cullop: No; it provides that the judge shall proceed no further with the case.  The fil-
ing of the affidavit deprives him of further jurisdiction in the case. 
Mr. Cox: [S]uppose the affidavit sets out certain reasons which may exist in the mind of 
the party making the affidavit; suppose the judge to whom the affidavit is submitted says 
that it is not a statutory reason?  In other words, does it not leave it to the discretion of the 
judge? 
Mr. Cullop: No, it expressly provides that the judge shall proceed no further. 
46 CONG. REC. 2627 (1911). 
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the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another 
judge shall be designated . . . to hear such matter.46 
 
Despite this clear language, judges consistently adopted a narrow 
definition of “bias and prejudice” and then reviewed affidavits to deter-
mine whether the allegations met that standard—a practice that essen-
tially permitted judges to pass on the sufficiency of the allegations 
against them.47  The Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. United 
States48 affirmed this trend, thereby “effectively eviscerat[ing] [§ 144’s] 
peremptory intent.”49 
The defendants in Berger, some of whom were of German descent, 
were accused of espionage.  They petitioned for the trial judge’s recusal 
on the ground that the judge was biased against German Americans, at-
testing by affidavit that the judge had stated, among other things, that 
“[o]ne must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced 
against the German Americans in this country.  Their hearts are reeking 
with disloyalty.”50  The judge had refused to recuse himself and had pre-
sided at the trial at which the defendants were convicted, and then had 
sentenced each defendant to twenty years in prison.51  Although the Su-
preme Court concluded that the trial judge could not himself decide the 
truth of allegations of bias, it did allow that the judge had the authority to 
review the affidavit and application for disqualification to ensure they 
were legally sufficient before being required to recuse himself.52  To be 
legally sufficient, the Court held that the affidavit “must give fair support 
to the charge of a [judge’s] bent of mind that may prevent or impede im-
                                                     
 46. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.  
§ 20 (1911)). 
 47. Bassett, supra note 8, at 1224, 1224 n.58 (2002) (“[D]espite the clear intentions of both the 
bill’s sponsor and the statute’s language, a series of judicial decisions quickly eradicated the peremp-
tory challenge intent behind the statute.” (footnote omitted)); Bloom, supra note 21, at 666 (“[T]he 
courts consistently construe the statute narrowly, which makes disqualification difficult.”); Frank, 
supra note 25, at 629, 626 n.98 (“Frequent escape from the statute has been effected through narrow 
construction of  the phrase ‘bias and prejudice.’”); Disqualification, supra note 25, at 238–39 (noting 
that § 144 was limited in application by judicial decisions narrowing its scope). 
 48. 255 U.S. 22 (1921). 
 49. FLAMM, supra note 9, § 23.4.1, at 675; see also Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 715 
(D. Idaho 1981) (“Although from the face of section 21 and from its legislative history it appears 
that the section was designed to create a fully peremptory approach to disqualification where bias or 
prejudice is alleged, the United States Supreme Court chose not to give the section such a broad 
reading.”); Ernest J. Getto, Peremptory Disqualification of the Trial Judge, 1 LITIG. 22, 23 (1975) 
(stating that the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger encouraged the federal courts to construe § 144 
as narrowly as possible). 
 50. Berger, 255 U.S. at 28. 
 51. Id. at 27. 
 52. Id. at 36. 
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partiality of judgment.”53  Hence, Berger gave trial judges considerably 
more discretion in deciding whether to disqualify themselves than Con-
gress had intended. 
Courts have freely exercised that discretion.  The leading treatise on 
judicial disqualification states that it is now “well established that the 
challenged judge has the prerogative, and may even have the duty, to 
pass on the timeliness and legal sufficiency of the §144 challenge in the 
first instance.”54  To be successful, the affidavit must contain specific 
facts and circumstances demonstrating bias; allegations based on hear-
say, opinion, or inferences are disregarded.55  Moreover, only allegations 
of a judge’s “personal bias” are sufficient.  That is, the bias must arise 
from an “extrajudicial source,” and not simply develop during the 
judge’s participation in the case.56  Finally, courts strictly construe the 
procedural requirements of form, timeliness, and legal sufficiency 
against the party seeking disqualification.57  Altogether, the judicial gloss 
on § 144 has meant that even though “the procedural requirements for 
obtaining judicial disqualification under § 144 would appear to be ex-
tremely easy to satisfy in a great many instances . . . disqualification un-
der this statute has seldom been accomplished.”58 
                                                     
 53. Id. at 33–34. 
 54. FLAMM, supra note 9, § 25.4, at 727. 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he facts averred 
must be sufficiently definite and particular to convince a reasonable person that bias exists; simple 
conclusions, opinions, or rumors are insufficient.”); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 135, 
135  n.317 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam) (noting that some courts do not permit an affida-
vit to contain hearsay); see also, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 9, § 25.7.2, at 733. 
At least one court has criticized this standard, commenting that the policy of disallowing an af-
fiant’s conclusions and inferences undermines the requirement that courts accept the affidavit as 
true.  United States v. Platshorn, 488 F. Supp. 1367, 1368–69 (S.D. Fla. 1980); see also Litteneker, 
supra note 5, at 238 n.8 (commenting that it is “difficult to reconcile” the “no-hearsay” rule with the 
requirement that affidavits be accepted as accurate because the “fact that the allegation is supported 
by hearsay should make no difference since it need not be supported by evidence at all”). 
 56. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1994) (discussing the “extrajudicial 
source” doctrine as it applies to both §§ 144 and 455 of Title 28 and concluding that a judge will not 
be required to recuse himself except in rare cases of “pervasive bias”—that is, bias “so extreme as to 
display clear inability to render fair judgment”); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 
(1966) (stating that the alleged bias “must stem from an extrajudicial source” and not from “what the 
judge learned from his participation in the case”). 
 57. For example, the Tenth Circuit has stated that “the affidavits filed in support of recusal are 
strictly construed against the affiant and there is a substantial burden on the moving party to demon-
strate that the judge is not impartial.”  United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 
1992); see also Winslow v. Lehr, 641 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (D. Colo. 1986) (stating that “the proce-
dural requirements are strictly construed”); FLAMM, supra note 9, § 25.8, at 737 (stating that “courts 
have generally construed § 144’s procedural requirements quite strictly”). 
 58. FLAMM, supra note 9, § 25.8, at 737–38 (stating that “§ 144’s disqualification mechanism 
has proven to be essentially ineffectual”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 3541, at 551 (2d ed. 1992) (“actual disqualifications under [§ 144] were rare”). 
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B. Recent Amendments to the Judicial Disqualification Laws 
In the 1970s, highly publicized controversies regarding several 
judges’ failures to disqualify themselves in questionable cases inspired a 
new round of reforms to disqualification laws.59  Among these were the 
revelations during Judge Clement Haynsworth’s unsuccessful 1969 Su-
preme Court confirmation hearings that he had sat on five different cases 
in which he had a small financial interest.  Also influential was the Sen-
ate’s rejection of Justice Abe Fortas’s nomination to the position of Chief 
Justice, due in part to his habit of serving as counselor to President John-
son even while serving on the Court.60  During Senate confirmation hear-
ings, Fortas admitted attending White House conferences concerning the 
most sensitive and important matters facing the administration, such as 
the escalation of the Vietnam War and the response to the Detroit riots.61  
Even after his nomination failed, Fortas’s troubles were not over.  The 
next year, Life magazine published an article on Fortas’s dealings with 
convicted financier Louis Wolfson, and Fortas was forced to resign un-
der intense media pressure.62  Finally, Justice (now Chief Justice) Wil-
liam Rehnquist’s refusal to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum63 further 
spurred Congress to take action. 
Laird v. Tatum involved a constitutional challenge to the Army’s 
surveillance of civilian political activity.  While serving in the Depart-
ment of Justice, Rehnquist had appeared as an expert witness at Senate 
hearings on that subject, and he had commented on the application of the 
law to the facts of the Laird case, which was then pending in a lower 
court.  After losing in the Supreme Court 5-4, the respondents in Laird 
filed a motion asking that Rehnquist recuse himself and that the case be 
reheard with eight Justices. 
Justice Rehnquist refused to recuse himself, and he took the unusual 
step of issuing a memorandum explaining why.64  He stated that in the 
                                                     
 59. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 717 n.12 (D. Idaho 1981); FLAMM, supra note 9,  
§ 23.6.1, at 678–79; Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 245 n.45. 
 60. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. at 717 n.12 (“Because of the problem raising from these cases a 
move to amend section 455 began to grow.”); MACKENZIE, supra note 25, at 67–94 (citing as exam-
ples of the controversies leading to § 455’s amendment the indictment of Seventh Circuit Judge Otto 
Kerner, the Senate’s rejection of Justice Abe Fortas’s nomination to Chief Justice, and the Senate’s 
rejection of Judge Clement Haynsworth’s nomination to the Supreme Court). 
 61. MACKENZIE, supra note 25, at 24. 
 62. Id. at 71–76.  For a more detailed discussion of these events, see LAURA KALMAN, ABE 
FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 370–73 (1990). 
 63. 409 U.S. 824 (1972). 
 64. In the first paragraph of that memorandum, Justice Rehnquist commented that he was the 
first Justice to issue such an explanation for a recusal decision.  Id. at 824. 
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course of preparing his Senate testimony he was given some information 
about the Laird case, but he insisted that he had “no personal knowl-
edge” of the case.65  Accordingly, Rehnquist concluded that he was not 
required to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because he had not 
been “of counsel” in the case or even substantially involved in it.66  Nor 
did he think his public statements and opinions on the law should lead 
him to recuse himself under § 455’s discretionary provision.67 
Justice Rehnquist admitted that the question whether he should 
recuse is “a fairly debatable one,” and he “concede[d] that fair-minded 
judges might disagree about the matter.”68  Nonetheless, he came down 
on the side of remaining on the case and cast the decisive vote in a deci-
sion that resolved the case in the manner consistent with his previously 
articulated views that the Army’s intelligence gathering was constitu-
tional.  Key to his decision was his belief that he had a “duty to sit” in 
any case in which he did not find clear grounds for recusal.69  Rehnquist 
noted that the courts of appeals had unanimously concluded that federal 
judges “ha[ve] a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as 
strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified,” and he found this duty to 
be even more compelling in the Supreme Court, where there is no substi-
tute for a recused Justice, and where recusal would lead to the possibility 
of affirmance by an equally divided Court.70 
Reacting to these controversies, the American Bar Association ap-
pointed a special committee charged with revising the Canons of Judicial 
Ethics to provide more guidance for judges about when to recuse them-
selves.  The Committee developed a new canon, Canon 3C, that fleshed 
out the standard for judicial disqualification.71  Most notable was the 
Canon’s creation of an objective “appearance of justice” standard that 
required a judge to recuse himself whenever “his impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned.”72 
In 1974, Congress followed the ABA’s lead and amended § 455 to 
broaden and clarify the grounds for judicial disqualification,73 using the 
ABA’s Canon 3C as its model.74  Congress explained that the goal of the 
                                                     
 65. Id. at 827. 
 66. Id. at 828. 
 67. Id. at 830. 
 68. Id. at 836–37. 
 69. Id. at 837 
 70. Id. 
 71. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1990). 
 72. Id. 
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351. 
 74. Id. at 2, 5 reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6354−55. 
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legislation was to “promote public confidence in the impartiality of the 
judicial system”75—confidence that had been shaken by the Haynsworth, 
Fortas, and Rehnquist controversies. 
Like Canon 3C, the amended § 455 established an objective “appear-
ance” standard that replaced the original § 455’s subjective standard 
permitting a judge to reference his own “opinion” when deciding 
whether to recuse himself.76  In the House Report, Congress stated ex-
plicitly that it intended the objective standard to eliminate the “so-called 
‘duty to sit.’”77  In addition, the amended version of § 455 defined a fi-
nancial interest as any legal or equitable interest, “however small,”78 
thereby eliminating the vague “substantial interest” requirement that had 
been such a problem for Judge Haynsworth.  The new § 455 also ad-
dressed the situation faced by Justice Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum by re-
quiring that a judge or Justice be disqualified if he or she had expressed 
an opinion concerning the merits of a case while serving as a government 
lawyer.79  Another important change was the inclusion in § 455 of the 
more general “bias and prejudice” standard80 that had previously been 
found only in § 144.  Because § 455 applies to all Justices, judges, and 
magistrates, and not just to district court judges as § 144 does, these 
broad substantive standards for recusal suddenly had much wider appli-
cation. 
C. Judicial Disqualification Laws Today 
Today, §§ 455 and 144 together govern disqualification in the federal 
courts.81  Although the two provisions contain different standards and 
procedures, they substantially overlap, and the relationship between the 
two is confusing.82 
                                                     
 75. Id. As Justice Scalia subsequently described the new standard, “what matters is not the real-
ity of bias or prejudice but its appearance.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). 
 76. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609; see also H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 
5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6354−55. 
 77. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.   
 78. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609, 1610. 
 79. Id. at 1609. 
 80. Id. 
 81. A third recusal statute provides that “[n]o judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the 
decision of a case or issue tried by him.”  28 U.S.C. § 47 (2000).  This statute is straightforward, 
narrow in application, and has been implemented without problem, and thus will not be discussed 
further. 
 82. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 
& 144, 1 (2002) (noting that “the relationship between [28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144] has been a source 
of some confusion”); see also Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 713 (D. Idaho 1981) (“The inter-
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As some courts have commented, § 455 “does not provide the proce-
dure for its enforcement.”83  Judges are expected to recuse themselves 
under § 455 sua sponte.  If they do not, parties have to invent the proce-
dures for seeking disqualification as they go along.  Judges also have no 
statutory guidance as to how to analyze and resolve the question of 
whether they are too biased or interested in the subject matter to sit on 
the case. 
In contrast, § 144 does provide some procedures to guide litigants.  
That statute requires the filing of a timely motion to disqualify along 
with an affidavit and a certificate of good faith by counsel.84  But, as dis-
cussed above,85 § 144 did not explicitly provide the standards by which 
courts were to review such motions, and courts have used this procedural 
gap to give themselves a great deal of leeway when reviewing motions 
and affidavits for “legal sufficiency.” 
Courts continue to narrowly interpret the amended statutes.  In Liteky 
v. United States,86 the Supreme Court again read an “extrajudicial 
source” requirement into § 455, holding that in most cases a judge could 
not be disqualified based on views derived from her participation in the 
legal proceedings.87  Yet, as the concurrence pointed out, nowhere in  
§ 455 did Congress indicate that the source of judicial bias or prejudice 
mattered when determining whether the judge was, or appeared to be, so 
biased as to create the appearance of partiality.88  Consistent with Liteky, 
courts of appeals rarely order disqualification when the basis for a claim 
of bias occurred during the legal proceeding itself.  For example, the 
Tenth Circuit upheld a district court judge’s refusal to recuse himself de-
spite his pretrial statement that “the obvious thing that’s going to hap-
                                                                                                                       
relation between section 144 and section 455 has been subject to various interpretations and has 
caused some confusion.”). 
       As one commentator described it, after 1948 the law of disqualification “consisted of two 
wholly independent statutes, one of which, § 455, was intended to be self-enforcing but rarely was, 
and the other, § 144, which was intended to be peremptory but never was.”  FLAMM, supra note 9,  
§ 23.6.1, at 678. 
 83. See, e.g., Fong v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
 84. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000). 
 85. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 86. 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994).  For a discussion of Liteky’s impact on judicial integrity, see 
Lawrence J. Hand, Jr., Note, Liteky v. United States—Jeopardizing Judicial Integrity, 40 LOY. L. 
REV. 995, 1009–10 (1995) (commenting that the Court’s decision in Liteky “may sacrifice, or at least 
erode, judicial integrity”). 
 87. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554. 
 88. Id. at 558 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The extrajudicial source doctrine has been criticized 
by commentators as “incompatible with the language of section 455(a) and the goals of the 1974 
amendments.”  See, e.g., Litteneker, supra note 5, at 252. 
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pen . . . is that [the defendant’s] going to get convicted . . . .”89  The 
Tenth Circuit first noted that the judge had not based his opinion on 
knowledge gained outside the courtroom and then concluded that the 
judge’s comment “does not show that the judge could not possibly render 
fair judgment.”90 
The duty-to-sit doctrine also remains alive despite Congress’s ex-
pressed intent to abolish it.  In 1993, seven Supreme Court Justices is-
sued a “Statement of Recusal Policy” announcing their views regarding 
recusal when a relative was involved in a case before them.91  In the 
course of describing their policy for recusal in such cases, these Justices 
declared more generally that they should not recuse themselves “out of 
an excess of caution” because “[e]ven one unnecessary recusal impairs 
the functioning of the Court.”92  This policy reflects the unique nature of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, in which a recusal would create the possibility 
of a tie vote that would leave a legal issue unresolved.93  In his memo-
randum defending his decision to sit on the Cheney case, Justice Scalia 
again noted this problem and commented that a decision to recuse is “ef-
fectively the same as casting a vote against the petitioner.”94  As the 
Statement of Recusal Policy and Scalia’s memorandum demonstrate, the 
duty-to-sit doctrine continues to guide recusal decisions by at least some 
of the Justices of the Supreme Court.95 
Although they do not face the same personnel problem, circuit courts 
have also made statements suggesting that they continue to adhere to the 
duty-to-sit doctrine.  For example, the Second Circuit recently declared 
that “where the standards governing disqualification have not been met, 
                                                     
 89. United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 90. Id. at 1415. 
 91. See 1993 STATEMENT OF RECUSAL POLICY, available through the Supreme Court clerk’s 
office.  The seven Justices who signed the Statement of Recusal Policy—Justices Rehqnuist, Ste-
vens, Scalia, Thomas, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg—all had “spouses, children, or other rela-
tives within the degree of relationship covered by 28 U.S.C. § 455 who are or may become practic-
ing attorneys.”  Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. However, the Court was originally established with an even number of Justices (six), and it 
has sat for significant periods during its history with an even number of Justices—suggesting that tie 
votes are not of overriding concern to Congress.  See Bias in the Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 
1446–47.  Finally, certain Justices frequently recuse themselves from cases because they own stock 
in one of the parties.  See generally Tony Mauro, Furor Over Scalia-Cheney Trip Casts Light on 
Murky World of Recusals, 175 N.J. LAW J. 732 (2004).  If avoiding ties was truly a priority, these 
Justices would have divested themselves of the stock that frequently requires their recusal. 
 94. 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2004). 
 95. Justice Ginsburg also cited the problem of tie votes in her response to a call by thirteen 
members of Congress for her to withdraw from all future cases concerning abortion because of her 
affiliation with NOW Legal Defense Fund.  See GOP Lawmakers Ask Ginsburg to Withdraw from 
Abortion Cases, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2004, at A18. 
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disqualification is not optional; rather, it is prohibited.”96  As one com-
mentator observed, “[d]espite the clarity of the congressional purpose to 
eliminate the duty to sit, many courts have continued to find some ver-
sion of such a duty.”97 
D. Calls for Reform of Judicial Disqualification Laws 
As a result of the controversy over Justice Scalia’s refusal to recuse 
himself from the Cheney case, judicial disqualification laws are again 
under scrutiny.  If history is any guide, this public attention may lead to a 
new round of amendments in an effort to ensure that the laws serve the 
intended goal of protecting the judiciary’s reputation and serving the liti-
gants’ interests. 
Calls for reform can already be heard.  The American Bar Associa-
tion Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
is currently considering revisions to the Code, and several of the com-
ments it has received refer explicitly to the Scalia-Cheney trip and sug-
gest changes to the rules to address similar future situations.98 
Although Congress has not taken any specific action yet, members 
have called for amendments to the disqualification laws in the wake of 
the Scalia-Cheney controversy.  On February 6, 2004, Reps. John Con-
yers, Jr. and Howard L. Berman, two Democrats on the House Judiciary 
Committee, called for hearings into “possible gaps in federal laws” that 
would allow Justice Scalia to sit on a case after vacationing with one of 
the litigants.  In a letter to the Committee’s Republican leaders, the De-
mocrats complained that “the recusal laws contain no process for poten-
tial conflicts to be reviewed by other judges.”99  In March 2004, Sen. 
John Kerry, the Democratic presidential nominee, issued a statement in 
response to the controversy.  He asserted that “[t]here is absolutely no 
question that when judges accept vacations and gifts from the parties be-
                                                     
 96. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 97. Litteneker, supra note 5, at 241 n.26 (citing cases); see also FLAMM, supra note 9,  
§ 20.10.2, at 615–18: 
Despite Congress’ clear intent to abolish the duty to sit rule as a restriction on a judge’s 
discretion when confronted with a judicial disqualification motion and despite the recog-
nition of some federal courts that a judge has no duty to sit whatsoever in any case, a 
number of federal courts have continued to invoke the duty to sit as a rationale for retain-
ing cases in certain circumstances. 
 98. See ABA JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 
available at www.abanet.org/judicialethics. 
 99. House Democrats Call for Hearings on High Court Conflicts of Interest, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
7, 2004, at A14. 
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fore them it erodes public trust in the courts.”100  Thus, it is possible that 
Congress will seek to amend judicial recusal laws again in the near fu-
ture. 
E. Lessons to Be Learned from Historical Experience 
That judicial recusal laws are amended by Congress in response to 
periodic crises does not make them unusual; laws often arise from vari-
ous public scandals, catastrophes, or other high-profile events that prod 
Congress into action.  Reform of the recusal statutes differs, however, 
because those amendments are designed to limit the authority of the very 
institutions (and individuals) responsible for construing them.  Because 
judges apply the statutes to themselves in cases in which they may have 
an improper personal interest, they have an incentive to narrowly con-
strue them.  Thus, despite Congress’s best efforts to craft disqualification 
laws that protect the reputation of the judiciary, the laws are inevitably 
narrowed through interpretation to the point where they no longer serve 
the intended purpose. 
The recusal statutes will fail to protect the reputation of the judiciary 
as long as they are implemented in an ad hoc fashion, without the proce-
dural protections that normally govern adjudication.  For as long as they 
have existed, the recusal statutes have operated in a procedural vac-
uum.101  The laws do not provide for appropriate disclosure of relevant 
facts, an adversarial presentation of the issues, or a neutral decisionmaker 
who issues a reasoned opinion on the question of disqualification.  For 
the reasons discussed in Part III, without these procedural protections, 
the judicial recusal laws will not fulfill their goal of promoting public 
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial system.  If these protections 
were in place, however, the laws might finally be interpreted as Congress 
intended, and applied in a manner that strengthens public confidence in 
the judiciary. 
Perhaps it should not be surprising that Congress has hesitated to dic-
tate procedures for courts to follow in such a sensitive area as judicial 
disqualification.  The legislative and executive branches may feel that it 
is inappropriate to dictate the minutiae of procedures to be followed 
when litigants seek to remove a judge from a case, preferring to leave it 
                                                     
 100. Josh Gerstein, Kerry Has Pressed a Long Campaign to Rein in Judges, N.Y. SUN, July 14, 
2004, at 1. 
 101. See Fong v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (noting that al-
though “[s]ection 455 provides a substantive test for disqualification, it does not provide the proce-
dure for its enforcement”). 
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to the judiciary to clean its own house.102  And Congress has good reason 
to tread lightly in this area.  Whenever Congress regulates the courts, it 
must keep in mind the need to maintain the separation of powers and to 
protect the judiciary’s independence.  In accordance with these princi-
ples, judges should not be forced to recuse themselves simply because 
they have expressed opinions and preferences that are at odds with those 
of the public or even just the parties before them.103 
Unfortunately, the judiciary has failed to step in and fill the proce-
dural void left by Congress.  Judges applying disqualification laws to 
themselves have no incentive to formalize the process, just as they have 
no interest in broadly construing the substantive recusal standards.  
Judges who wish to maintain collegial relations with one another hesitate 
to set in stone recusal procedures that might be viewed as disrespectful of 
their fellow judges.  This concern is particularly evident at the U.S. Su-
preme Court, where the nine active Justices must sit on all cases together 
and seek to forge coalitions from term to term.  Perhaps for this reason, 
the Justices have established the practice of referring recusal motions to 
the very Justice whose impartiality is being questioned, rather than de-
ciding the issue collectively.104 
In conclusion, the lesson learned from the troubled history of judicial 
disqualification is that better procedures, rather than stricter substantive 
standards, are needed to govern the law’s application.  Whether those 
procedures are imposed by Congress, by professional associations such 
as the American Bar Association, or by the judiciary itself is not signifi-
cant.  What matters is that procedures be developed so that disqualifica-
tion laws fulfill their goal of promoting public confidence in the justice 
system. 
III. PROCEDURE AS A SOURCE OF JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 
As described in Part II, one of Congress’s main objectives in enact-
ing judicial disqualification laws is to promote public confidence in the 
                                                     
 102. Cf. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988) (noting that  
§ 455 does not prescribe any particular remedy for its violation and commenting that “Congress has 
wisely delegated to the judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies that will best serve the purpose 
of the legislation”); Mauro, supra note 93 (describing Congress’s reluctance to regulate the Supreme 
Court). 
 103. See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and 
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1992) (discussing the 
“confusion about bias, impartiality, knowledge, and experience” in the context of selecting judges 
and juries). 
 104. See infra note 207−09 and accompanying text. 
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federal court system by ensuring that judges are not only impartial in 
fact, but also that they maintain the appearance of impartiality.105  The 
judiciary has more riding on its institutional reputation than the other two 
branches of government.  As Alexander Hamilton observed, the judicial 
branch, possessing “no influence over either the sword or the purse,”106 
must take care to foster the public trust that serves as the main source of 
its authority.107  The Supreme Court has also explicitly recognized the 
importance of maintaining the trust of the people, declaring the need to 
“preserve both the appearance and reality of fairness,” which “‘gen-
erat[es] the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice 
has been done.’”108 
The recent controversy over whether Justice Scalia should have 
recused himself from the Cheney case exemplifies how thoroughly 
recusal laws have failed to protect the reputation of the judiciary.  Al-
though reasonable people can differ about whether Justice Scalia should 
have recused himself, most would agree that the process by which the is-
sue was raised and decided—through front page articles, outraged edito-
rials, political cartoons, late-night talk show host humor, criticism by 
members of Congress, and, finally, a defensive memorandum by Scalia 
justifying his decision to remain on the case—has had a negative effect 
on the public’s perception of the judiciary.  And as described in Part II, 
the Cheney case is just one of a long series of cases in which the debate 
over recusal has itself impugned the reputation of the judiciary, and it is 
unlikely to be the last.109 
Some commentators have sought to put an end to the controversy by 
advocating an expansion of the grounds for judicial disqualification.110  
                                                     
 105. See discussion supra Part II.A (describing Congress’s intention to protect the reputation of 
the judiciary through judicial disqualification laws). 
 106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 
1974); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s 
authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confi-
dence in its moral sanction.”). 
 107. See Bloom, supra note 21, at 663 (“Public confidence is essential to effective functioning of 
the judiciary because, ‘possessed of neither the purse nor the sword’ the judiciary depends primarily 
on the willingness of members of society to follow its mandates.”). 
 108. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Liljeberg v. 
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (stating that maintaining the public’s con-
fidence is important); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (stating that an impartial judge is 
one way the judicial system maintains fairness); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) 
(stating that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”); Ex parte McCarthy, 1 K.B. 256, 259 
(1923) (stating that “Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen 
to be done”). 
 109. See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 110. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 8; Frank, supra note 8; Leitch, supra note 8; The Standard, 
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Congress has often followed these suggestions; Congress has amended 
disqualification laws on five occasions, each time broadening their 
scope.111  As described in Part II, legislative solutions have proved inef-
fective because judges have interpreted the laws narrowly when applying 
them to themselves.112  In any case, it is not clear that the substantive 
standards for disqualification should be lowered so far as to force judges 
to withdraw from cases simply because editorial writers or late-night talk 
show hosts suggest that they do so.  The question whether a judge can sit 
on a case should not be decided solely in the court of public opinion.  In-
deed, to require judges to remove themselves whenever they are the sub-
ject of criticism would be antithetical to the judiciary’s role as a bulwark 
against the vagaries of public opinion.113 
To improve the law of judicial disqualification so that it serves to 
protect the judiciary’s reputation, it is first necessary to identify the 
sources of the public’s faith in the judiciary that the laws seek to pre-
serve.  Unelected judges regularly countermand the decisions made by 
elected officials, and yet for the most part the public abides by, and re-
spects, the judiciary as an institution.  In other words, judicial decision-
making is viewed as legitimate, despite its countermajoritarian nature.  
Volumes have been written seeking to locate the source of the public’s 
respect for, and adherence to, countermajoritarian judicial decisionmak-
ing.114 
Political scientists and legal theorists have recognized that proce-
dures serve an important legitimating function for institutions in which 
the decisionmakers are appointed and/or given life tenure rather than 
elected and accountable to the constituents they govern.115  Probably the 
                                                                                                                       
supra note 8; Bias in the Federal Courts, supra note 8. 
 111. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 112. See discussion supra Parts II.B−E. 
 113. See supra note 13. 
 114. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (2d ed. 1986) (de-
scribing the “counter-majoritarian” nature of the judicial system); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITU-
TIONAL FATE 3–5 (1982) (discussing judicial review of legislation); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 4–12 (1980) (discussing conflicts between judicial 
review and democracy); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11–12 (1980) (discussing the 
role of interpretivism in the judicial system); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term—
Forward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46 (1989) (noting that for decades the 
scholarly literature about judicial review has been primarily concerned with resolving the counter-
majoritarian difficulty).  See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) (discussing the 
evolution of the countermajoritarian debate). 
 115. BORK, supra note 13, at 2 (“The democratic integrity of the law . . . depends entirely upon 
the degree to which its processes are legitimate.”); John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and 
Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657, 682 (1994) (describing how “[m]any procedural ele-
ments found in judicial and administrative adjudication perform a surrogate legitimation function”); 
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most influential of these schools of thought in law has been Legal Proc-
ess theory116—a procedurally oriented view of what it is courts should do 
that was formulated and presented by Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, and 
Herbert Wechsler in Hart and Wechsler’s casebook The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System117 and in Hart and Sacks’s equally influential 
book The Legal Process.118  Legal Process scholarship responded to at-
tacks on the judiciary by Legal Realists119 by defining the “boundaries 
and purposes” of federal judicial power in an effort to demonstrate that 
judicial decisionmaking is both “legitimate[] and restrained.”120 
Legal Process theorists were certainly not the first to turn to proce-
dure as a source of judicial legitimacy,121 and their scholarship has 
spawned many second- and third-generation process theorists who have 
elaborated upon and developed their ideas.122  While much remains con-
tested about the sources of judicial legitimacy, most participants in the 
discussion agree on several essential procedural components of adjudica-
tion that legitimize it as a method of decisionmaking in a democratic so-
ciety.  As described in detail below, I extract from this literature the fol-
lowing five procedural components of adjudication that are universally 
considered essential to the legitimacy of the final product: (1) litigants, 
                                                                                                                       
Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 315 (1997).  See 
generally Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining  and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3; Alan Hyde, 
The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379. 
Some of these scholars deeply disagree with one another about the role of procedure in legiti-
mating judicial decisionmaking.  For example, Professor Peters disagrees with Professor Bork’s 
view that the judiciary must follow certain procedures to avoid engaging in the type of “law-
declaring” that only the legislature legitimately may do.  Professor Peters argues instead that appro-
priate procedures can legitimate adjudicative lawmaking.  However, for the purposes of this Article 
the relevant point—and one on which all these scholars agree—is that adjudicative procedures le-
gitimate judicial decisionmaking. 
 116. The influence and longevity of Legal Process methodology has been frequently remarked 
upon.  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 18 at 693–95; Fallon, supra note 18, at 970–71. 
 117. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM (1953). 
 118. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
 119. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 120. Amar, supra note 18, at 694; see also Fallon, supra note 18, at 964 (“[M]ost of us, Hart and 
Wechsler assume, are prepared to accept the claim to legitimacy of thoughtful, deliberative, unbiased 
decisions by government officials who are reasonably empowered to make such decisions.”). 
 121. See Amar, supra note 18, at 693 (noting that many of the ideas and perspectives enunciated 
in Hart’s, Wechsler’s, and Sacks’s work “had been gestating for years”); Fallon, supra note 18, at 
963 (“Taken individually, most of Hart and Wechsler’s doctrinal and policy questions were not 
original even in 1953. Similar questions have been raised at least since Congress addressed the ques-
tion of how to allocate judicial power in the first Judiciary Act.”). 
 122. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1977); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  
(1980). 
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not courts, initiate disputes; (2) the disputes are presented through an ad-
versarial system in which two or more competing parties give their con-
flicting views; (3) a rationale must be given for decisions; (4) decisions 
must refer to, and be restricted by, an identifiable body of law; and (5) 
the decisionmaker must be impartial.123  Although scholars of the federal 
court system may not agree on why these particular procedural elements 
legitimize adjudication, the list is nonetheless a generally accepted de-
scription of the attributes of judicial decisionmaking considered essential 
to good (i.e. legitimate) adjudication.124 
Furthermore, not only are these procedural elements generally agreed 
by scholars to be essential to judicial legitimacy on a theoretical level,  
they also are justified by reference both to the institutional competences 
of the courts as well as to the Constitution’s articulation of the scope of 
judicial power.  These procedures are thus legitimating not only because 
they provide a theoretical justification for the exercise of judicial power 
in a democracy, but also because they serve to further the Framers’ in-
                                                     
 123. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 124. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 115, at 682 (“Procedures that require published rules, party 
participation, reasoned decisions, and communicated rationales have the intended and actual effect 
of enhancing public perceptions of legitimacy.”); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1979): 
  The judge is entitled to exercise power only after he has participated in a dialogue 
about the meaning of the public values.  It is a dialogue with very special qualities: (a) 
Judges are not in control of their agenda, but are compelled to confront grievances or 
claims they would otherwise prefer to ignore.  (b) Judges do not have full control over 
whom they must listen to.  They are bound by rules requiring them to listen to a broad 
range of persons or spokesmen.  (c) Judges are compelled to speak back, to respond to the 
grievance or the claim, and to assume individual responsibility for that response.  (d) 
Judges must also justify their decisions. 
. . . . 
  The judge is required to listen and to speak, and to speak in certain ways.  He is also 
required to be independent.  This means, for one thing, that he not identify with or in any 
way be connected to the particular contestants.  He must be impartial, distant, and de-
tached from the contestants, thereby increasing the likelihood that his decision will not be 
an expression of self-interest (or preferences) of the contestants, which is the antithesis of 
the right or just decision. 
See also Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1341–42 (2001): 
Ideally, the adversary system allows each contending party to argue his or her case to an 
open-minded and disinterested judge who will reach a decision only after having heard 
and properly weighed all the relevant evidence presented as well as after having duly 
considered the conflicting interpretations of relevant legal precedents advanced by each 
of the contenders. . . .  At the very least, [], such a judge promotes the rule of law by 
reaching an unbiased (in the sense that he or she has no reason to favor any party before 
the court over any other), legally-grounded, and procedurally fair decision that, by and 
large, should make dispute resolution through law preferable to other alternatives for a 
vast majority of the citizenry. 
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tended role for the courts in our constitutional structure. 
Finally, the list of procedures described below is not merely norma-
tive or aspirational, but also descriptive; most disputes are presented to 
and decided by judges in accordance with these procedures.  One of the 
few exceptions is the process (or lack thereof) that governs judicial 
recusals.  As discussed in Part IV, recusal law’s abandonment of these 
traditional forms of adjudication has led to its failure to perform its in-
tended legitimating function. 
A. Litigants Initiate and Frame Disputes 
Federal courts do not initiate litigation.  They wait for third parties to 
bring conflicts to them for resolution.  In the U.S. model of adjudication, 
courts do not have agenda-setting powers and do not conduct their own 
investigations.  Instead, they are confined to responding to the disputes 
initiated by injured parties. 
As Professor Christopher Peters has observed, one source of adjudi-
cative legitimacy comes from the participation of the litigants in framing 
and presenting disputes for courts to resolve.125  By participating in the 
judicial process, the parties—winner and loser alike—have consented to 
the outcome, and consent of the governed has always been viewed as es-
sential to legitimizing forms of government decisionmaking.126  And 
solely from an instrumental perspective, participation of the bound par-
ties improves decisionmaking by ensuring that those with the most to 
gain (and lose) have provided their insights and views to the decision-
maker.127 
That courts must wait for parties to bring disputes to them is fitting 
in light of the judiciary’s institutional limitations.  The third branch does 
not have the manpower and resources needed to investigate and com-
mence disputes.  Judges are generalists, meaning that they do not have 
the expertise to identify and investigate specific societal problems in 
                                                     
 125. Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1, 20 (2001) (observing that a “court case is initiated not by the court but by one of the par-
ties,” and noting that it is the participation of the litigants that lends legitimacy to judicial decision-
making). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927), reprinted in 2 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, 235, 364 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1984); JOHN STUART 
MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861), reprinted in UTILITARIANISM, 
ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 187, 224 (H.B. Acton ed., 
1972) (noting that “each is the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests”). 
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need of adjudication.128  Furthermore, because federal judges are not 
elected and have no constituency they can plausibly claim to represent, 
they lack the mandate to create their own agenda.  Thus, the affected par-
ties are usually the best-situated to bring forward and frame their dis-
putes for judicial resolution, because they have firsthand knowledge of 
the problem at issue and can best decide when, if, and how to frame that 
dispute.129 
The Framers intended to limit judges to resolving disputes raised by 
others, and that view is reflected in Article III of the Constitution.  
Judges must wait until a “case” or “controversy” is brought to them; 
nothing in the text of Article III empowers courts to manufacture cases 
for themselves.130  The Framers did not foresee the need for the legions 
of judges that would have been required were the judiciary to be assigned 
the task of investigating cases and initiating litigation.  Accordingly, the 
Constitution did not mandate the creation of hundreds of new judicial of-
ficers, but rather vested the judicial power in “one Supreme Court” and 
“in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”131 
Although not explicitly prohibited by the Constitution’s text, it 
would be constitutionally suspect for judges to take over the investiga-
tion and prosecution of cases.  First, such tasks would interfere with the 
ability to carry out the primary task of judging; second, engaging in these 
activities would impermissibly mix the judicial function with that of the 
executive;132 and third, permitting courts to choose which issues to ad-
dress and when to address them would vest too much power in the hands 
of the government.  The Framers preferred that the people retain the abil-
ity to choose which cases to bring to the courts for resolution.133 
                                                     
 128. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 31–36 (1938). 
 129. For discussion of the judiciary’s institutional limitations in this regard, see Molot, supra 
note 16, at 60. 
 130. Id. at 64–65. 
 131. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 132. Alexander Hamilton explicitly discussed the danger to liberty if the judicial branch were to 
take on the powers of the other branches as well: 
For I agree, that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the leg-
islative and executive powers.’  It proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have noth-
ing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union 
with either of the other departments . . . . 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 497 (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (quoting 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 
SPIRIT OF LAWS 181 (1748)). 
 133. See Molot, supra note 16, at 66–67 (describing the Framers’ mistrust of the judiciary and 
relatively greater confidence in litigants and juries to play key roles in the judicial process). 
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B. Adversarial Presentation of Disputes 
The adversarial presentation of disputes is another basic component 
of the traditional adjudicatory model.134  Under an adversary system, op-
posing parties have an opportunity to present their conflicting arguments 
to a relatively passive decisionmaker.  In his seminal article “The Forms 
and Limits of Adjudication,” Lon Fuller declared that the parties’ re-
sponsibility for presenting “reasoned arguments” in support of their re-
spective positions was the “essence” of adjudication.135  It is the parties 
who conduct investigations, choose which issues to pursue in litigation, 
and prepare and present arguments and evidence to the factfinder.136  Al-
though courts will occasionally raise issues or arguments on their own, 
these instances are rare and usually have to be justified by other limita-
tions on judicial power, such as the court’s inability to decide questions 
outside of its jurisdiction or its interest in avoiding pronouncements on 
constitutional questions.  This system is in sharp contrast to the inquisito-
rial systems of many other countries, in which state agents control litiga-
tion.137 
Party control over case-presentation is legitimating for much the 
same reasons that party control over case-initiation is legitimating.  
Again, it is important symbolically that the parties who will be bound to 
the decision have a role in persuading the decisionmaker of their point of 
view.138  And the fact that the litigants will be the most directly affected 
by the decision has instrumental value, for it improves the quality of their 
                                                     
 134. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 
IND. L.J. 301, 301 (1989) (“[T]he hallmark of American adjudication is the adversary system.”). 
 135. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364–65 
(1978). 
 136. Peters, supra note 125, at 21 (commenting that “judges in our model of adjudication typi-
cally do not rely upon evidence outside the record, or engage in their own investigative efforts, or 
even rely on legal arguments other than those advanced by the parties”). 
 137. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380–82 (1982).  Mirjan Dam-
aska has observed that inquisitorial legal systems tend to spring from political regimes that are less 
concerned with citizen participation in government decisionmaking.  MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE 
FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 
154–73 (1986).  That the United States has adopted a litigant-centered rather than judge-centered 
model of adjudication thus speaks not only to the qualities the citizens of the United States value in 
adjudication, but also the qualities they value in government decisionmaking more generally.  See 
also Peters, supra note 125, at 22 (“Adjudication in the Anglo-American common-law tradition thus 
draws legitimacy from the same source as majoritarian political decisionmaking in the western de-
mocratic tradition.  That source is the meaningful participation of the governed in the making of de-
cisions that will bind them.”). 
 138. Fuller, supra note 115, at 19 (stating that the adversary model respects the dignity of the 
individual by affording those “affected by the decisions which emerge . . . [a] formally guaranteed 
opportunity to affect those decisions”). 
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participation and thus the quality of the final decision.139  As Professor 
Peters has argued, the role of the parties in framing and arguing their 
own cases serves a legitimating function similar to that of reasoned de-
liberation in the legislative sphere.140  Participation by the interested par-
ties ensures that “a greater diversity of interests [are] represented in the 
decisionmaking process” than would occur were the court to decide 
without litigant input, just as deliberation adds voices and perspectives to 
Congress’s decisionmaking.141  By bringing in the most interested parties 
to make arguments and present facts, the process of adjudication assures 
that the decisionmaker has as much relevant information as possible be-
fore her when making a decision. 
Institutionally, American judges are not well suited to engage in fac-
tual investigations of social problems because they lack the resources and 
the public mandate to do so.  Courts do not have large staffs to gather 
and sift through evidence for them and, even if they did, they do not 
make good representatives of a constituency because they do not engage 
in dialogue with their constituents or otherwise attempt to remain in tune 
with the wishes of the general population that they serve. 
Finally, limiting the judicial role to that of decisionmaker, rather than 
investigator, is in keeping with the Framers’ intent that the judiciary be 
separate from the executive, and that the people maintain power and con-
trol over adjudication.142 
C. Reasoned Decisionmaking 
Reasoned decisionmaking—“the explicit act of offering a justifica-
tion or explanation for the result reached”143—is a hallmark of the legal 
process.144  In his article “Giving Reasons,” Professor Frederick Schauer 
observed that the practice of providing reasons for legal decisions is 
“central to what makes the legal enterprise distinctive.”145  Justifying  
 
                                                     
 139. R.L. Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law Method, 
57 B.U. L. REV. 807, 817 (1977) (“[T]he common law method has salutary procedural consequences 
in that it brings into the legal decisionmaking process precisely those person who bear the impact of 
a decision.”). 
 140. Peters, supra note 125, at 356. 
 141. Id. at 358. 
 142. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 143. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636 (1995). 
 144. HART & SACKS, supra note 118, at 143–52; Fallon, supra note 18, at 966 (“Reason and 
reasoned elaboration are the stuff of the judicial process.”). 
 145. Schauer, supra note 143, at 634. 
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decisions is widely viewed as a vital source of legitimacy for judicial de-
cisionmaking.146 
As Professor Schauer noted, the need to give reasons is a sign of the 
weakness of the decisionmaker.147  Those in positions of unquestioned 
authority over subordinates—such as teachers, army officers, and par-
ents—do not need to explain their decisions before their subordinates 
will comply with their commands.  Only those whose authority is more 
tenuous must justify their rulings.  As Schauer puts it, “reasons are what 
we typically give to support what we conclude precisely when the mere 
fact that we have concluded is not enough.  And reasons are what we 
typically avoid when the assertion of authority is thought independently 
important.”148 
That the judiciary ordinarily gives reasons for its conclusions is thus 
both a sign of its weakness as well as a means of bolstering its legiti-
macy.149  Congress, which gains its legitimacy through periodic elec-
tions, enacts statutes in the form of commands without justification.  The 
judiciary cannot act with the same assumption that its orders will be fol-
lowed without question.150  Rather a judge must explain and justify his 
                                                     
 146. Peters, supra note 125, at 20–21; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 16 (1999); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of 
Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Deci-
sions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 775−76 (1995) (quoting former D.C. Circuit 
Judge Patricia Wald’s statement that reasoned opinions “lend decisions legitimacy, permit public 
evaluation, and impose a discipline on judges,” and concluding that reasoned decisions “thus pro-
mot[e] public confidence in the integrity of the courts”); Resnik, supra note 137, at 378 n.13 (“When 
ruling, judges are obliged to provide reasoned explanations for their decisions . . . .”); Owen M. Fiss, 
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (1979); Fuller, supra note 135, at 367; Alexander M. 
Bickel, Is the Warren Court Too “Political”?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1966, § 6, at 30 (“The Court 
must be able to demonstrate by reasoned argument why it thought the action right or necessary . . . .  
An action for which there is no intellectually coherent explanation may be tolerable . . . but it is for 
the political institutions to take, not for the Court.”). 
 147. Schauer, supra note 143, at 637. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Of course, reasons do not always accompany judicial decisions.  Motions are often decided 
without explanation, and the Supreme Court’s denials of certiorari almost never come with reasons.  
However, the fact that these more marginal decisions are issued without justification only serves to 
illustrate that the norm for final, binding decisions on the merits of a question of law are usually ac-
companied by an explanation. 
     Appellate courts increasingly issue summary affirmances without decision.  However, cases un-
accompanied by a written decision are usually unanimous decisions on questions that the court has 
addressed and previously answered with a reasoned explanation.  And yet even in such cases the 
practice has been criticized in part because it undermines judicial legitimacy.  See, e.g., Anne Coyle, 
A Modest Reform: The New Rule 32.1 Permitting Citation to Unpublished Opinions in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2491 (2004); Dragich, supra note 146, at 787, 
797−802. 
 150. Schauer, supra note 143, at 658 (“[W]hen decisionmakers expect voluntary compliance, or 
when they expect respect for decisions because the decisions are right rather than because they ema-
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decisions, which serves the dual purposes of proving that the judge has 
heard the litigants’ arguments and demonstrating to the loser that the de-
cision was not arbitrary or based on illegitimate preferences.151 
In addition, reasons legitimize judicial decisions by committing the 
court to a general principle that controls a category of cases, which 
forces it to look beyond personal biases regarding the parties or emo-
tional reactions to the facts in the specific case before it. 152  “[T]o pro-
vide a reason for a decision is to include that decision within a principle 
of greater generality than the decision itself.”153  Reason-giving thus 
serves as a constraint on judicial power, cabining judicial discretion 
through the act of articulating general principles that will serve to bind 
the judge in future cases.  A related benefit is that explaining and justify-
ing judicial decisions forces the decisionmaker to slow down, guarding 
against a gut reaction to a case or a party that cannot be justified by a 
general principle.154  Finally, because courts publicly declare reasons for 
their decisions, they cannot deviate too far from the mores and values of 
the community they serve.  For example, a federal judge could not justify 
the outcome of a case simply by citing the race of the litigants, because 
race is not a legitimate ground for decisionmaking by the United States 
government. 
Institutionally, courts are well suited to the task of reasoned deci-
sionmaking.  The act of giving a reason for a decision is best done by one 
or a small number of individuals, rather than a large group that might 
find it difficult to reach a consensus even on an outcome, and nearly im-
possible to articulate a single rationale for that outcome.  Reasoned deci-
sionmaking is also a valuable means of communication with the other 
                                                                                                                       
nate from an authoritative source, then giving reasons becomes a way to bring the subject of the de-
cision into the enterprise.”). 
     This very principle was expressed by Justice Anthony Kennedy and Rep. Jose Serrano (D.-N.Y.) 
during Kennedy’s testimony in March 2004 defending the Court’s proposed budget.  In the course of 
a tense discussion in which Serrano commented that he was still “trying to figure out what you folks 
did in the 2000 election to pick a president,” Kennedy stated, “We are the only branch of govern-
ment that must give reasons for what we do.  They are in the opinions.”  Representative Serrano re-
sponded, “We give reasons, too.  It is called re-election.”  Tony Mauro, Courtside: When Planets 
Collide, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 10. 
 151. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An 
Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 412 (1978).  In describing and defending the Legal 
Process methodology, Professor Richard Fallon explained “[w]hat seems crucial to the notion of 
reasoned elaboration is that the value judgments occur within a process of legal reasoning, rather 
than being imposed from the outside as a judge’s personal, dictatorial preferences.”  Fallon, supra 
note 18, at 973 n.85. 
 152. Schauer, supra note 143, at 652–53. 
 153. Id. at 641. 
 154. Id. at 656–57. 
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two branches of government about the acceptable limits of their powers.  
For example, Congress will know by reading a court’s decision striking 
down a statute whether it is free to amend the law to overrule that deci-
sion or whether the Constitution itself prohibits the goal Congress wished 
to accomplish.  By giving reasons, courts also set out a road map for liti-
gants and judges to follow in the future.  Citizens can better accord their 
conduct with the law when they are given reasons for a particular deci-
sion in a particular case. 
Explanations are essential for courts to perform the tasks assigned to 
them under the Constitution.  Reason-giving is necessary to “reconcile[]” 
“clashing” statutes, as courts must do to fulfill their role as “interpreters 
of the law.”155  Likewise, the Framers did not intend courts to strike 
down laws enacted by Congress without first explaining how they con-
flict with the Constitution.156  Finally, the multi-tiered structure of the 
federal courts systems require reasoned decisionmaking so that appellate 
courts can review lower courts’ pronouncements. 
D. Reference to Governing Body of Law 
Yet another core principle of adjudication is that judges are not to 
decide cases based solely on their own personal views, but rather must 
constrain themselves to applying and interpreting a recognized body of 
law.157  Chief Justice John Marshall first articulated that limitation on 
federal judicial power in Marbury v. Madison.158  “[C]ourts may act only 
when there is law, based on precedent, to apply.  Courts do not possess 
authority to assert their own will.”159  The view that judges are con-
                                                     
 155. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Seigliano ed., 2000). 
 156. Id. at 500. 
 157. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (“The no-
tion that courts ordinarily should follow precedent in deciding cases is one of the core structural fea-
tures of adjudication in common-law legal systems.”); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1465 (2003) (“Judges are supposed to decide cases 
according to the law, and this practice may be essential to the legitimacy of the judiciary.”); Nicholas 
S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L. J. 353, 506 (1989) (“As long as 
courts cultivate the perception that they are constrained and distinguishable from the political 
branches, their legitimacy will remain intact.”). 
Although common law cases are decided without reference to a written body of law, they are 
nonetheless bounded by the judicial precedent.  In deciding common law cases, courts make refer-
ences to the principles in these decisions and, at least in theory, justify application of the principle to 
the new fact situations before them.  Judges are not free to simply disregard the body of decisions in 
this area just because there is no written, codified rule in place. 
 158. 5 U.S. 137, 165 (1803). 
 159. Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial 
Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 55 (1995); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 
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strained by a body of law—whether that be statutory law or judge-made 
precedent—is by now a firmly established procedural limitation on judi-
cial decisionmaking. 
In attempting to legitimate judicial power, Legal Process theorists 
declared that courts must not simply read their own personal preferences 
into law, but should instead decide cases by referring to principles and 
policies that are deeply embedded in society as a whole.160  The Legal 
Process school’s primary concern was to respond to Legal Realist criti-
cism by demonstrating that the judiciary was constrained in its choices, 
and was not simply deciding cases based on personal preferences, as an 
elected legislator might do.161 
In more recent academic literature, commentators have noted that the 
common law method of reasoning by analogy promotes judicial legiti-
macy by ensuring that adjudication operates as interest representation.162  
Under the common law method, judicial decisions are binding only on 
those that are similarly situated to the original parties.  This process en-
sures that litigants serve as vicarious representatives because their legal 
arguments will influence the outcome only for those future litigants that 
share their same interests. 
Adherence to precedent not only cabins judicial discretion, it also 
promotes fairness and predictability in judicial decisionmaking.163  If like 
cases must be decided alike, then judges are less free to reach outcomes 
based on their personal attitudes toward the litigants or the causes they 
promote.  Requiring all judges to follow the same precedents helps to 
standardize decisionmaking and minimize inconsistency in judicial deci-
sions, which in turn strengthens the credibility of those decisions and of 
the judiciary as an institution.164 
The Framers of the Constitution also intended that the judiciary 
make decisions in accord with an identifiable body of law.  Alexander 
Hamilton articulated that presumption in Federalist No. 78, explaining: 
“To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that 
                                                                                                                       
1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 64–65 (1992) 
(“Courts are to stick to law, judgment, and reason in making their decisions and should leave poli-
tics, will, and value choice to others.”). 
 160. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLI-
CATION OF LAW 160 (tentative ed. 1957). 
 161. Professor Fallon stated that a basic assumption of Legal Process Theory is that the judicial 
role “is limited to the reasoned elaboration of principles and policies that are ultimately traceable to 
more democratically legitimate decisionmakers.”  Fallon, supra note 18, at 966. 
 162. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 193, 203 (1992); Brilmayer, supra note 139, at 817; Peters, supra note 125, at 366–68. 
 163. Schauer, supra note 143, at 595–98. 
 164. Id. at 600. 
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they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to 
define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before 
them.”165 
E. Impartial Decisionmaker 
An impartial decisionmaker is essential to the legitimacy of any sys-
tem of adjudication.  The significance of an unbiased judge has been rec-
ognized in such varied and historical sources as the Old Testament,166 the 
Code of Justinian,167 and Shakespeare’s Henry VIII,168 and has been de-
scribed as the most basic requirement of due process.169  In the Legal 
Process theorists’ conception of adjudication, the judge must be 
“thoughtful and dispassionate”170 in reviewing the facts and arguments 
presented, and must bring to the case an “uncommitted mind.”171  A deci-
sion by a judge lacking such an open mind would not be worthy of the 
respect ordinarily due judicial pronouncements. 
An impartial decisionmaker also serves the instrumental value of im-
proving the accuracy of judicial decisionmaking.  A judge who is free 
from bias or prejudice is more likely to reach the correct result than one 
who is not. 
Like all the procedural elements of adjudication discussed thus far, 
independent decisionmakers also serve the important non-instrumental 
value of protecting the reputation of the adjudicatory process by “gener-
ating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has 
                                                     
 165. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 
1974). 
    166.    See, e.g., Devarim Deuteronomy 16:18–20 (“Judges and officers shall you appoint in all 
your cities … and they shall judge the people with righteous judgment.  You shall not pervert judg-
ment, you shall not respect someone’s presence, and you shall not accept a bribe, for the bribe will 
blind the eyes of the wise and make just words crooked.  Righteousness, righteousness shall you pur-
sue….”). 
 167. See supra note 20. 
 168. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY THE EIGHTH act 2, sc. 4 (Queen Katherine of 
Aragon refuses to permit Cardinal Wolsey to sit as judge in her case because he was her “most mali-
cious foe” and thus would not be a “friend to truth” in her case.). 
 169. Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (“[A]n impartial decisionmaker is essen-
tial.”); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975); Martin H. 
Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986) (“[U]se of an ‘independent adjudicator’ is a sine qua non of 
procedural due process.”); see also discussion supra Part II (describing historical background of im-
partial decisionmaker requirement). 
 170. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Jus-
tices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 124 (1959). 
 171. Fuller, supra note 135, at 386. 
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been done.”172  When the decisionmaker appears to have a personal in-
terest in the outcome of the litigation, the legitimacy of the final decision 
is in question.  “Few situations more severely threaten trust in the judi-
cial process than the perception that a litigant never had a chance because 
the decisionmaker may have owed the other side special favors.”173 
An impartial judge is also a value enshrined in the Constitution.  Ar-
ticle III requires that federal judges be given life tenure and prohibits 
diminution of judicial salaries.174  Alexander Hamilton explained that 
such protections were necessary to ensure judicial independence, com-
menting that “a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over 
his will.”175  In addition, the Constitution’s allowance for federal jurisdic-
tion in cases between parties from different states is yet another protec-
tion against actual or apparent judicial bias, because it arose from a con-
cern that state court judges might be partial to their own citizens.176  
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that an unconflicted decisionmaker 
is an “essential” element of the “due process” guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.177 
IV. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION’S DEPARTURE FROM TRADITIONAL 
FORMS OF ADJUDICATION AND THE RESULTING LOSS OF 
LEGITIMACY 
The five essential elements of adjudication described in Part III are 
not just normative ideals, they are descriptive of the processes followed 
in most American adjudication.  As a general matter, the parties frame 
disputes that are decided by an impartial judge who issues a reasoned de-
cision that references an established body of law.  On rare occasions 
when courts stray from this traditional model of adjudication—as they 
tend to do when overseeing class actions or pre-trial practice, for exam-
                                                     
 172. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 173. Redish & Marshall, supra note 169, at 483. 
 174. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
 175. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).  More 
recently, the Supreme Court has also cited the importance of these protections in ensuring judicial 
independence.  See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) 
(stating that the judiciary was designed “to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained 
impartial”). 
 176. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
 177. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972) (finding a violation of the Due 
Process Clause where the decisionmaker had a financial interest in the proceeding); Goldberg v. Kel-
ley, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (“[A]n impartial decisionmaker is essential.”); In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”). 
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ple—they are subject to criticism.178 
This Part describes how the process by which a judge decides 
whether to recuse herself is one of the few areas in which judges consis-
tently abandon these traditional forms of adjudication.  Commentators 
have paid little attention to the procedural void in recusal law, perhaps 
because the question of judicial disqualification is such a sensitive one 
that it appears to be sui generis, and to be appropriately outside of the 
traditional model of adjudication.  However, as discussed in Part III, the 
basic procedural elements that govern most adjudication serve a vital le-
gitimating function.  Disqualification laws have failed to protect the 
reputation of the judiciary because judges do not follow these traditional 
forms of adjudication when deciding whether they must recuse them-
selves. 
A. The Law of Judicial Disqualification Has Deviated from the 
Traditional Forms of Adjudication 
1. It Is Difficult for Litigants to Seek Judicial Disqualification 
Section 455 of Title 28 does not outline any procedures by which 
parties may seek disqualification; rather, the judge is supposed to con-
sider whether to recuse himself on his own volition.  The very absence of 
statutorily prescribed procedures discourages lawyers from moving for 
disqualification and makes recusal motions all the more ad hoc and ex-
ceptional.  In contrast, § 144 does contain clear procedural requirements 
for seeking judicial disqualification.  However, because § 144 requires 
recusal only upon the more difficult showing of actual bias, rather than 
the “appearance” standard in § 455, and because it applies only to district 
courts, it is far less frequently cited as the basis for a disqualification mo-
tion.179 
The absence of statutory procedures exacerbates the difficulties in-
herent in seeking a judge’s disqualification.  A lawyer might reasonably 
hesitate to make such a motion, fearing that it will anger the judge before 
whom he will have to try the case if he loses.  Even if the issue is clear-
cut and the motion is sure to succeed—if not before the challenged 
                                                     
 178. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 
2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 95 (noting that litigants may be better satisfied when disputes are framed 
by parties and judges’ decisions are based on an identifiable body of law); Molot, supra note 16, at 
59 (“[W]hen judges stray from their traditional adjudicative role, they trigger questions regarding the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of their actions.”); Resnik, supra note 137, at 424–31. 
 179. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 82, at 48–49. 
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judge, then at least on appeal—a lawyer might still be concerned that the 
motion would annoy a judge before whom he expects to appear regu-
larly.180  Such fears are not unfounded.  For example, a district court 
judge stated that he found the motion for his disqualification to be “of-
fensive” and he asserted that it “impugn[ed his] integrity.”181 
A more basic problem is that the parties often lack the factual infor-
mation necessary to make such a motion.182  A party or his lawyer may 
hear rumors about a relationship between a judge and the opposing party, 
but unless that information can be corroborated, the party and his lawyer 
will hesitate to ask the judge to recuse himself on the basis of speculation 
or gossip.183  Indeed, affidavits based on hearsay are considered legally 
insufficient to justify recusal.184  Nor are there any procedures establish-
ing how a party can investigate such rumors to determine whether there 
is any truth to them.  Judges are generally not required to disclose infor-
mation about relationships, bias, or conflict of interest that they do not 
                                                     
 180. See ALAN J. CHASET, DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY PEREMPTORY CHAL-
LENGE 58 (1981) (noting that “[j]udges, like other persons, are likely to resent charges of bias”); 
FLAMM, supra note 9, § 1.10.5, at 25 (commenting that “[j]ust as judges generally do not like to ad-
mit having committed legal error, they are typically less than eager to acknowledge the existence of 
situations that may raise questions about their impartiality”); Bassett, supra note 8, at 1244 (noting 
that “many judges approach recusal decisions with a presumption of participation and with a touch 
of defensiveness”); Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 244 (observing that judges often take a defensive 
tone in their opinions denying disqualification motions); Litteneker, supra note 5, at 260 (“Counsel 
who would face a particular judge many times in his career would be hesitant to charge the judge 
with bias or to refuse a judge’s request that he waive his right to disqualify.”). 
For similar reasons, lawyers rarely file complaints against judges under the Judicial Conduct 
and Disability Act.  Although attorneys are in the best position to observe and evaluate judicial be-
havior, they were responsible for filing only six percent of the complaints between 1980 and 1991.  
Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial 
Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
25, 45 (1993).  In a 1993 report, the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal stated 
that “testimony before the Commission, surveys, and interviews with attorneys reveal a widespread 
reluctance among members of the bar to file a complaint.  This type of risk aversion is common 
among those who appear frequently in federal court, notably government lawyers.”  Report of the 
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 100 (1993).  Lawyers report a reluctance 
to make even informal complaints against judges.  Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judi-
cial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 256–59 (1993). 
 181. Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 182. See DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL: A MANUAL ON PRACTICE IN 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS § 5.2, at 27–28 (2d ed. 1990) (“[T]he lawyer will probably 
have insufficient information to feel comfortable in asserting without reservation that the judge 
should have been disqualified.”). 
 183. Although federal judges are required to disclose gifts and honoraria received, those forms 
are filed only once a year—which may come far too late for a party to determine whether the judge 
has accepted gifts from a party or litigant in a pending case.  5 U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101–11 (2003).  In 
any case, a judge may have a close relationship with a lawyer or litigant that might prejudice the 
judge in that individual’s favor even though no gifts are exchanged. 
 184. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
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perceive as disqualifying.185  For all these good reasons, parties rarely 
seek disqualification, waiting instead for the court to do so on its own 
motion. 
2. Adversarial Presentation Is Absent Under Current Disqualification 
Procedures 
Even when one party seeks the judge’s recusal, the opposing party in 
litigation may remain silent on the recusal question.  In many cases, the 
other party may not have any grounds to oppose the motion because that 
party has no idea whether the judge has a bias or financial interest that 
would justify disqualification.  As one commentator noted, the chal-
lenged judge is the one “most familiar with his own conduct,”186 and thus 
the most appropriate party to respond to a disqualification motion.  Yet 
the judge does not respond—at least not in a traditional adversarial man-
ner—because she is responsible for deciding the legal question of 
whether her conduct merits disqualification. 
3. Judges Often Do Not Give a Reasoned Explanation for Recusal 
Judges who recuse themselves rarely issue a decision explaining 
why.  When Justice Frankfurter recused himself sua sponte from Public 
Utilities Commission v. Pollak,187 he wrote a separate opinion discussing 
his reasons for doing so and declared that judges should publicly state the 
grounds for recusal decisions.188  However, this practice has generally 
not been followed.  One commentator has even referred to disqualifica-
tion as “typically a quiet, almost invisible, legal issue.”189 
The process is particularly mysterious when a judge recuses herself 
sua sponte.  But even when a judge is asked to step aside by one of the 
parties, it is often not clear whether the judge’s decision to do so is based 
on bias-in-fact or simply concern that remaining on the case would create 
the appearance of impartiality.  The lack of transparency exists even at 
the highest levels of the federal court system.  For example, many of the 
sitting Justices have recused themselves from hundreds of cases, almost 
                                                     
 185. However, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that judges have an ethical duty to “disclose on 
the record information which the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant 
to the question of disqualification.”  Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 186. Litteneker, supra note 5, at 266. 
 187. 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
 188. Id. at 466–67. 
 189. Bassett, supra note 8, at 1214. 
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always without explanation.190  Presumably they own stock or have some 
other financial position that might be affected by the litigation, but be-
cause they do not issue explanations, their reasons for withdrawal are 
unknown.191 
4. The Precedent on Disqualification Is One-Sided 
The federal statutory standards for recusal are vague.  Section 455(a) 
of Title 28 requires a federal judge to “disqualify himself in any proceed-
ing in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  Courts 
have struggled with the meaning of “impartial” and have differed over 
whose viewpoint to adopt when deciding whether it would be “reason-
able” to question a judge’s impartiality.  For instance, some courts have 
suggested that the “reasonableness” standard should be viewed from the 
perspective of an objective judge because a non-judicial observer is “less 
inclined to credit judges’ impartiality and mental discipline than the judi-
ciary itself will be.”192  In contrast, others have concluded that the stan-
dard should be based on a “reasonable person” with knowledge of all of 
the relevant facts.193  Moreover, even when applying the same standards, 
courts will differ over when the language of the statute requires recusal. 
Normally, ambiguous statutory text is clarified by a body of judicial 
precedent developed by judges applying the language to the specific 
cases before them.  In the area of recusals, however, the judicial prece-
dent is noticeably lopsided.  Judges are more likely to publish opinions 
when denying a motion to disqualify than when granting one, meaning 
that the majority of published judicial decisions elaborate the reasons 
why a judge should continue to sit, and relatively few address circum-
stances justifying recusal.194  Justice Scalia’s recusal decisions this term 
alone are illustrative of the problem.  When he recused himself in Elk 
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (concerning a challenge to the 
recitation of the pledge of allegiance in the public schools),195 he did so 
                                                     
 190. Mauro, supra note 93.  There is a wide disparity in the rates of recusal.  Justice Breyer 
recuses himself most often, averaging forty-two times a year, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Ginsberg recuse themselves seven times a year, the lowest average. 
 191. See Bloom, supra note 21, at 690 n.172 (noting that Justices rarely state their reasons for 
disqualifying themselves). 
 192. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 193. United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 194. Other commentators have noted this problem.  See Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 244–45 
(“[A] judge who withdraws usually writes no opinion.  Published opinions, consequently, form an 
accumulating mound of reasons and precedents against withdrawal; meanwhile, some judges rou-
tinely and silently disqualify themselves in comparable cases.”). 
 195. 540 U.S. 945 (2003).  Justice Scalia did not issue a public statement or ruling announcing 
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without explanation, while he published a twenty-one page memorandum 
justifying his decision to sit on the Cheney case. 
5. The Challenged Judge Is Not an Impartial Decisionmaker 
The Catch-22 of the law of judicial disqualification is that the very 
judge being challenged for bias or interest is almost always the one who, 
at least in the first instance, decides whether she is too conflicted to sit on 
the case.  Although precedent does exist for referral of disqualification 
motions to a neutral judge,196 it is rare.197  As one commentator has 
noted, the “policy against automatic transfer [of a motion to disqualify] is 
[] firmly embedded in court practice.”198 
Exacerbating this problem is the deferential standard of appellate re-
view of a trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify.  Circuit courts re-
view such decisions only for abuse of discretion.  One court opined that 
its review is deferential because a “judge presiding over a case is in the 
best position to appreciate the implications of those matters alleged in a 
recusal motion”199—a view that simply ignores the possibility that a 
judge’s refusal to recuse might be affected, consciously or uncon-
sciously, by the very bias that is claimed as the basis for recusal.  Liti-
gants seeking recusal bear an even heavier burden if they seek to bring 
                                                                                                                       
that he was recusing himself.  Instead, the Court’s order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari 
was accompanied by the statement that “Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision 
of these motions and this petition.”  Interestingly, Justice Scalia made his first public statement about 
his recusal in Newdow in his memorandum in In re Cheney, when he stated that “recusal is the 
course I must take—and will take—when, on the basis of established principles and practices, I have 
said or done something which requires that course.  I have recused for such a reason this very Term.”  
In re Cheney, 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2004). 
 196. See, e.g., In re Lieb, 112 B.R. 830, 837 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); Bradley v. Milliken, 426 
F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Rademacher v. City of Phoenix, 442 F. Supp. 27 (D. Ariz. 1977); 
United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
 197. See, e.g., United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
motion to disqualify is usually heard by the challenged judge); In re Demjanjuk, 584 F. Supp. 1321, 
1322 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (stating that most federal courts resolve recusal motions themselves); 
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d  31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (recusal motions normally first ruled upon 
by the judge who is the subject of the motion); see also FLAMM, supra note 9, § 17.5.1 at 513–17 
(explaining that a judge challenged by a judicial disqualification motion usually decides the motion 
him or herself).  However, some states have made such a transfer mandatory, either through statute 
or court rule.  See id. § 17.5.3, at 521 (stating that in some jurisdictions “the challenged judge must 
either recuse himself or transfer the motion to another judge”); Edward G. Burg, Comment, Meeting 
the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1445, 1465 (1981) (stating that 
in one case “judges on a court collectively disqualif[ied] one of their benchmates”). 
 198. Litteneker, supra note 5, at 266.  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has discouraged transfer.  United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 131 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 199. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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the issue to the court of appeals before the merits of the case are de-
cided,200 even though immediate appeal of the disqualification decision is 
the only meaningful avenue for obtaining an impartial judge’s review of 
a refusal to recuse.201 
But at least there is review of a district court’s refusal to recuse.  
Litigants seeking to remove an appellate judge have a slim chance of get-
ting an impartial decisionmaker to review the challenged judge’s deci-
sion to remain on the case.  At both the circuit and Supreme Court levels, 
the challenged judge decides for himself whether to recuse.  Theoreti-
cally, a circuit court judge’s refusal to recuse could be reviewed by the 
en banc court or by the Supreme Court, but such review is so rare as to 
have little practical effect.  The Supreme Court has adopted the practice 
of letting an individual Justice decide a motion asking him or her to 
recuse, and there is no system in place for the full Court to review that 
decision if the Justice refuses to step down.202 
B. The Cheney Case: The Consequences of Flawed Recusal Procedures 
The process leading up to Justice Scalia’s decision not to recuse him-
self from the Cheney case illustrates how far the recusal process has de-
viated from the traditional model of adjudication described in Part III. 
1. Background 
The fact that Justice Scalia and Vice President Cheney went on vaca-
tion together after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in the Che-
ney case was not disclosed to the public or the parties by either Scalia or 
Cheney.  It only came to national attention when reported in the L.A. 
Times on January 17, 2004.203  The story was quickly picked up by other 
papers.  Then, in early February, the L.A. Times reported in a front-page 
                                                     
 200. As the Second Circuit explained: 
[W]e must bear in mind not only the standards governing recusal, but we must also con-
sider the extraordinary showing required to obtain the issuance of a writ of manda-
mus . . . .  [P]etitioners must “clearly and indisputably” demonstrate that the district court 
abused its discretion.  Absent such a showing, mandamus will not lie. 
In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Drexel Burnham Lambert, 861 F.2d at 
1312–13). 
 201. FLAMM, supra note 9, § 31.2, at 973 (“[F]or a court’s decision on disqualification to be 
meaningfully reviewed, it usually must be appealed immediately.”). 
 202. See generally Bassett, supra note 8. 
 203. David G. Savage, Trip With Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia, L.A. TIMES,  Jan. 17, 
2004, at A1. 
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story that Justice Scalia had traveled on Air Force Two as “an official 
guest” of Vice President Cheney.204  On the heels of this story came a 
wave of editorials proclaiming that Justice Scalia should recuse himself 
because his vacation with Cheney created at the very least the appear-
ance that he could not be impartial when deciding the case.205  Accompa-
nying the news stories were a large number of political cartoons, and 
jokes about the trip were included in the monologues of late-night come-
dians.206 
During this time, Justice Scalia did not make any public statement.  
He did issue a short written response to inquiries by an L.A. Times re-
porter confirming that he and Vice President Cheney had gone on a 
duck-hunting trip in Louisiana together after certiorari was granted in the 
Cheney case.  He concluded with a two-sentence statement about why he 
believed that this social contact did not obligate him to recuse himself 
from the case: 
I do not think my impartiality could reasonably be questioned.  Social 
contacts with high-level executive officials (including cabinet officers) 
have never been thought improper for judges who may have before 
them cases in which those people are involved in their official capacity, 
as opposed to their personal capacity.207 
                                                     
 204. David G. Savage & Richard A. Serrano, Scalia was Cheney Hunt Trip Guest, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 2004, at A1. 
 205. See, e.g., Editorial, Duck-Blinded Ethics; Scalia Puts Supreme Court Integrity at Risk, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 6, 2004, at B8; Editorial, One Case Scalia Should Skip, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2004, at B16; Editorial, Scalia Should Recuse Himself, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 9, 
2004, at B5; Editorial, Scalia, Use Good Judgment; Bow Out of Cheney Case, ATL. JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Jan. 29, 2004, at 14A; Editorial, Scalia’s Apparent Conflict, B. GLOBE, Feb. 7, 
2004, at A14; Editorial, Scalia’s Conflict of Interest, DENV. POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at B7; Editorial, 
Scalia’s Not-So-Excellent Journey; Hunting Trip with Cheney Was Highly Inappropriate, BUFFALO 
NEWS, Feb. 4, 2004, at C4; Editorial, Sit This One Out, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at 35; Edito-
rial, Too Close for Comfort, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2004, at B6; Editorial, Too Close for Comfort, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2004, at 10A. 
 206. See Mot. to Recuse, Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct. for D.C.  124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004) (No. 
03-475). 
 207. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Reporter David Savage (Jan. 16, 2004) (on file with 
author) (emphasis in original).  Prior to his March 18, 2004, memorandum, Justice Scalia com-
mented publicly on the matter on just one other occasion.  When asked about the controversy while 
speaking at Amherst College on February 10, 2004, Justice Scalia responded that he did not need to 
recuse himself, because the lawsuit involved Cheney in his official and not personal capacity, and he 
repeated that it is “acceptable practice” for Justices to socialize with members of the executive 
branch.  He finished his comment by declaring, “That’s all I’m going to say for now.  Quack, 
quack.”  Associated Press, Scalia Says He’ll Stay on Cheney Court Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, 
at A30. 
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Scalia provided no details about travel arrangements, allocation of ex-
penses, lodgings, other attendees, or when the joint trip had been 
planned. 
As the press attention increased, members of Congress began to 
weigh in on the matter.  On January 22, Senator Patrick Leahy, ranking 
Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, and Senator Joe Lieberman, rank-
ing Democrat on the Governmental Affairs Committee, jointly wrote to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist questioning whether Justice Scalia should sit on 
the case: “When a sitting judge, poised to hear a case involving a particu-
lar litigant, goes on a vacation with that litigant, reasonable people will 
question whether that judge can be a fair and impartial adjudicator of that 
man’s case or his opponent’s claims.”208  The two senators asked the 
Chief Justice to clarify the rules Justices follow in deciding whether to 
remove themselves from cases and inquired as to “whether mechanisms 
exist . . . for review of a justice’s unilateral decision to decline to recuse 
himself.”209 
In his reply, Rehnquist stated that “[t]here is no formal procedure for 
court review of the decision of a justice in an individual case.  That is so 
because it has long been settled that each justice must decide such a 
question for himself.”  He then chastised the senators for expressing their 
views that Scalia should recuse himself from the Cheney case: “Anyone 
at all is free to criticize the action of a justice—as to recusal or as to the 
merits—after the case has been decided.  But I think any suggestion by 
you or Senator Lieberman as to why a justice should recuse himself in a 
pending case is ill-considered.”210 
The parties remained silent on the matter for several weeks.  Then, 
on February 13, Judicial Watch, the conservative public interest law firm 
that is co-plaintiff on the Cheney case with the Sierra Club, publicly 
stated that it “does not believe the presently known facts about the hunt-
ing trip satisfy the legal standards requiring recusal.”211 
                                                     
 208. This letter was reported in news stories.  See, e.g., David G. Savage, High Court Won’t Re-
view Scalia’s Recusal Decision, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at A12. 
 209. Id.  Democratic Representatives Henry A. Waxman (D-Cal.) and John Conyers Jr. (D-
Mich.) also wrote to Chief Justice Rehnquist urging him to establish a procedure for “formal review” 
of Justices’ ethical conflicts.  The two argued that Justice Scalia had failed to recuse himself despite 
precedent in lower courts requiring recusal in such situations.  They wrote: “It is no exaggeration to 
say that the prestige and power of the Vice President are directly at stake in the case.”  David G. 
Savage, 2 Democrats Criticize Scalia’s Refusal to Quit Cheney Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at 
A26. 
 210. Savage, supra note 208. 
 211. In re Cheney, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (2004). 
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The Sierra Club disagreed, and on February 23 it took the unusual 
step of filing a motion asking Justice Scalia to recuse himself from the 
case.  The motion was submitted to the full Court, and the Sierra Club 
intended that all nine Justices address it just as they would any other 
question of law.  David Bookbinder, the Sierra Club’s Washington legal 
director, stated: “Obviously, this is an issue for each of the nine justices 
to consider, since the integrity of the entire court is being called into 
question.”212  Nonetheless, the full Court did not address the motion.  
The docket entry for the motion stated: “In accordance with its historic 
practice, the Court refers the motion to recuse in this case to Justice 
Scalia.”213 
As is typical when one party asks a judge to recuse himself, the op-
position did not respond to the motion.  Indeed, the government never 
commented on the issue either in legal filings or in the press. 
More than three weeks passed before Justice Scalia issued a twenty-
one page memorandum decision denying the motion.  Before he did so, it 
was not clear that Justice Scalia would respond at all.  The Justices nor-
mally do not issue statements about decisions to recuse.  For example, 
when the respondent in Newdow asked Justice Scalia to recuse himself 
earlier the same term because he had commented on the merits of the 
question presented, Justice Scalia had not issued any formal response.  
The public and the parties learned that he had recused himself from the 
case only because the Court’s order granting a writ of certiorari in the 
case was accompanied by the statement that “Justice Scalia took no part 
in the consideration or decision of . . . this petition.”214 
Thus, the length and detail of Justice Scalia’s response was surpris-
ing.  To ask a Supreme Court Justice to recuse himself is rare; for the 
Justice to respond at length is almost unprecedented.  During the Court’s 
long history, the only comparable explanation for a denial of a motion to 
disqualify came from Justice Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum, who began his 
memorandum by stating that he did not “wish to suggest” that providing 
such an explanation was “desirable or even appropriate” in most cases.215  
                                                     
 212. David G. Savage, Sierra Club Asks Scalia to Step Aside in Cheney Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
24, 2004, at A17. 
 213. Docket statement (02-5354, 02-5355, 02-5356), 541 U.S. 913 (2004). 
 214. 540 U.S. 945, 945 (2003). 
 215. 409 U.S. 824 (1972).  In his memorandum explaining his decision not to recuse, Rehnquist 
stated that “neither the Court nor any Justice individually appears ever to have” provided a similar 
justification for remaining on a case.  He added, “I do not wish to suggest that I believe such a 
course would be desirable or even appropriate in any but the peculiar circumstances present here.”  
Id.  Rehnquist provided a much shorter explanation of his decision to sit on the Microsoft antitrust 
litigation despite the fact that Microsoft had hired the firm at which his son was a lawyer.  See Mi-
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Justice Scalia’s memorandum was thus a significant departure from past 
practice. 
In the memorandum, Justice Scalia revealed facts about circum-
stances and logistics of the trip that previously had been unknown to the 
general public and to the Sierra Club, and then he made a persuasive case 
for why he should not be required to recuse himself.  Nonetheless, his re-
sponse did not settle the matter.  In a second wave of editorials, the same 
newspapers that had called for Justice Scalia to recuse himself criticized 
his rationale for remaining on the case, and some also condemned a 
recusal process that left the final decision in the hands of the very indi-
vidual whose judgment was under question.216 
2. The Handling of the Recusal Question in the Cheney Case 
Undermined the Reputation of the Judiciary 
The Cheney case well illustrates the problems created by the lack of 
formal procedures governing judicial disqualification.  The dispute was 
difficult for the parties to frame.  At first, the Sierra Club could not have 
raised the recusal issue because it was unaware of the trip.  Justice Scalia 
was not required by law to inform the parties about his social relations 
with a litigant in a case before him.  Thus, without the benefit of 
sharp-eyed journalists, the Sierra Club would never have learned that a 
Justice had recently vacationed with its opponent. 
Even after the Sierra Club formally filed its motion, there was no ad-
versarial presentation of the dispute.  The government did not weigh in 
on the question whether Justice Scalia should sit on the case.  The only 
“adversary” was Justice Scalia.  Although not required to do so, Justice 
Scalia eventually did respond at length, revealing the facts and circum-
stances of the trip that had hitherto been known only to him and the oth-
ers on the trip.  He also attempted to frame the dispute in terms of the 
law governing judicial recusals, although he admitted that precedent was 
sparse.217  But although Scalia provided an opposing view, he did not do 
                                                                                                                       
crosoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2000). 
 216. See, e.g., Paul Campos, Editorial, Scalia Ducking the Issue, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 30, 
2004, at 31A (criticizing Justice Scalia for turning the “reasonable observer” test “into what might be 
called the ‘I’m a reasonable observer, and I didn’t observe anything that makes me question my im-
partiality’ test”); Editorial, New Rules Needed on When Justices Should Step Aside, DET. NEWS, 
Mar. 29, 2004, at 10A (urging the Court to adopt a new rule requiring the whole Court to determine 
whether a justice should step aside because the current practice is “eroding public confidence in the 
court”). 
A smaller number of editorialists defended Scalia’s decision to remain on the case.  See, e.g., 
Ronald D. Rotunda, Commentary, Duck Hunting Benchmarks, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at B4. 
 217. Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004). 
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so as part of the adversarial process but rather in his role as final deci-
sionmaker. 
As a result of this procedural vacuum, the question of whether Jus-
tice Scalia should recuse himself from the Cheney case entered the public 
discourse in a manner that undermined the public’s faith in the judiciary.  
Because news of the Scalia-Cheney trip was first publicly “broken” by a 
journalist, rather than revealed by the Justice himself, it created a percep-
tion that the Justice had something to hide—even though, as Justice 
Scalia later made clear, he did not perceive the trip as inappropriate in 
any way.  Moreover, details about the trip continued to leak slowly, 
rather than being fully disclosed at once, which generated a series of 
news stories that kept the issue in the public eye and heightened the per-
ception that the trip had been improper.  For example, shortly before the 
story was reported, Justice Scalia confirmed by letter with an L.A. Times 
reporter that he had gone on the trip with Vice President Cheney.  But 
Scalia did not disclose that he had traveled with the Vice President on 
Air Force Two, which became the subject of a second front-page story 
once the press learned of it from other sources. 
The press is certainly capable of generating controversy where none 
exists, and a Justice cannot be expected to anticipate and deflate every 
negative news story about his or her activities.  Nevertheless, that Justice 
Scalia and members of his family traveled with Vice President Cheney 
on a government plane was newsworthy; it strongly suggested that they 
saved themselves the price of the trip, which would not only be grounds 
for recusal but would also potentially violate the Ethics Reform Act of 
1989.218  Therefore, the revelation about Justice Scalia’s travel arrange-
ments could reasonably be expected to generate a follow-up story.  Yet it 
was a detail that could just as easily have been revealed up front by Jus-
tice Scalia at the same time that he confirmed taking the trip. 
Moreover, as Justice Scalia eventually disclosed in his memoran-
dum, neither he nor his relatives “saved a cent” by traveling with the 
Vice President because they had all purchased round-trip airline tickets 
for the return trip home.219  Because this is the kind of information that 
only Justice Scalia could know, and because the information is directly 
relevant to the question whether Justice Scalia could properly sit on the 
case, it should have been revealed as soon as the trip itself became pub-
lic.  Immediate disclosure of the information might have prevented pub-
                                                     
 218. 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (1996) (prohibiting gifts to, among others, federal judges from any person 
“seeking official action from, doing business with, . . . or whose interest may be substantially af-
fected by the performance or nonperformance of the individual’s official duties”). 
 219. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 921. 
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lication of some of the news stories and editorials that tarnished Justice 
Scalia’s reputation, and, by extension, the Court’s. 
Because of the absence of formal procedures for filing recusal mo-
tions, the public debate about whether Justice Scalia should recuse him-
self dragged on for two months.  The Sierra Club did not file a motion 
seeking his disqualification until five weeks after the story first broke.  
Section 455 contains no procedures for filing such a motion, and thus it 
provides no time limit that would have forced the Sierra Club to act ear-
lier.  The Sierra Club had good reason to wait.  The more editorials, car-
toons, and jokes on late-night talk shows, the stronger its argument that 
Justice Scalia’s impartiality might “reasonably be questioned.”  Ironi-
cally, § 455’s lack of procedural requirements, coupled with the objec-
tive standard for recusal that takes account of public appearances, actu-
ally encourages parties to wait to seek recusal until the press has 
repeatedly reported on, and criticized, a Justice for sitting on a case—
leading to the negative public perception of the judiciary that the law was 
designed to prevent. 
Finally, because the process was not an adversarial one, no one gave 
the press or the public the other side of the story or defended the propri-
ety of taking such a trip.  Instead, for two months the public heard only 
one version of the story: Justice Scalia took a vacation with Vice Presi-
dent Cheney, at government expense, shortly after the Court agreed to 
hear Cheney’s case, which many thought created at least the appearance 
that Justice Scalia could not be impartial. 
Eventually, Justice Scalia spoke up in his own defense.  In his 
memorandum decision, Scalia asserted heretofore unknown facts about 
the trip to rebut the arguments of his sharpest critics.  Most relevant were 
the following: (1) Scalia’s invitation to Cheney to join him on a duck-
hunting trip, and Cheney’s acceptance, came before the petition for cer-
tiorari was filed in the Cheney case;220 (2) Scalia and his family members 
did not save any money as a result of traveling with the Vice President 
because they all bought round-trip plane tickets;221 (3) the trip was at-
tended by thirteen hunters as well as various staff and, of course, security 
for the Vice President, and thus was not, in Scalia’s view, an “intimate 
setting”;222 (4) Scalia “never hunted in the same blind with the Vice  
 
                                                     
 220. Id. at 914. 
 221. Id. at 912−13. 
 222. Id. at 915. 
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President” and was never alone with him at any time during the trip;223 
and (5) Scalia and Cheney did not discuss the case.224 
Justice Scalia then complained that many of the newspaper editorials 
calling for his recusal had their facts wrong.225  He pointed out that some 
of the editorialists exaggerated the length of the trip, misidentified who 
paid for the travel and who was the guest of whom, and, most impor-
tantly, suggested that he had been alone with the Vice President during 
the trip and had an opportunity to discuss the case with him.226 
Although some of these inaccuracies are indeed significant (one 
wonders just who was editing these editors), Justice Scalia could have 
prevented them from ever being put into print if he had simply disclosed 
the relevant facts himself.  Significantly, Justice Scalia did not deny that 
certain details about the trip were relevant to the question whether he 
should have recused himself, and thus were proper topics to be shared 
with the public.  To the contrary, in defending his decision not to recuse 
himself, he repeatedly asserted that he was never alone with the Vice 
President and never had the opportunity to discuss the case with him.227  
Yet he, along with the Vice President, chose to remain silent about these 
significant details of the trip even as they were being inaccurately re-
ported in the media. 
Justice Scalia began the memorandum by stating that “[t]he decision 
whether a judge’s impartiality can ‘reasonably be questioned’ is to be 
made in light of the facts as they existed, and not as they were surmised 
or reported.”228  But that is arguable.  On the one hand, the media’s igno-
rance of the facts should not force recusal where it is unjustified.  But on 
the other hand, the facts as “reported” are the ones that the public first 
read.  They shape the public’s impressions of the propriety of a Justice’s 
actions and ultimate decision to sit on a case.  If appearances matter—
and the recusal laws say they do—then the public’s perception of the 
facts, even an inaccurate perception, can damage the judiciary’s reputa-
tion in the very ways that the recusal laws intended to prevent.  Accord-
ingly, to protect the judiciary’s reputation from harm, judges should take 
some responsibility to ensure that the facts are accurately presented to 
the public from the beginning. 
                                                     
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 923. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 913, 923 (stating that his impartiality could not “reasonably be questioned” where he 
“never hunted with [Cheney] in the same blind or had other opportunity for private conversation”). 
 228. Id. at 914. 
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In his memorandum decision, Justice Scalia noted that the Sierra 
Club was “unable to summon forth a single example of a Justice’s 
recusal (or even motion for a Justice’s recusal) under circumstances simi-
lar to those here.”229  The absence of precedents supporting recusal can 
be partly explained by the fact that judges and Justices usually do not 
give reasons for their recusals.  Supreme Court Justices have recused 
themselves in 500 cases during the last five years, but only very rarely 
have they given the public any inkling as to why.230  Perhaps some of 
those recusals were because the Justice had a personal relationship with a 
litigant or lawyer, and thus would have served as precedent for Scalia’s 
recusal from the Cheney case.  There is simply no way to know.  And the 
dearth of motions to recuse may also be explained by the many proce-
dural and psychological hurdles that discourage litigants from seeking 
recusal in the first place.231 
The memorandum did not put the matter to rest, in part because Jus-
tice Scalia was the sole judge of his own partiality.  Several editorials 
criticized the Supreme Court’s system of allowing the challenged justice 
to decide whether to recuse him or herself and called on the Court to 
change its rules so that all nine Justices will have to decide such ques-
tions in the future.232 
Exacerbating the problem was the defensive and sarcastic tone of the 
memorandum,233 which read more like an opposing brief than a legal de-
cision.  Justice Scalia appeared to be pained by the press coverage of the 
trip, noting that he had received “a good deal of embarrassing criticism 
and adverse publicity” about the matter.234  He commented somewhat 
bitterly that, as the Sierra Club has “cruelly but accurately” pointed out, 
he had become “fodder for late-night comedians.”235  At different points 
throughout the memorandum he acknowledged being aware of which 
newspapers had criticized him, and, in what appeared to be retribution, 
he very specifically stated which papers reported which facts incor-
                                                     
 229. Id. at 924. 
 230. See, e.g., Mauro, supra note 93. 
 231. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 232. See, e.g., Campos, supra note 216; Editorial, New Rules, supra note 216 (urging the Court 
to adopt a new rule requiring the whole Court to determine whether a Justice should step aside be-
cause the current practice is “eroding public confidence in the court”). 
 233. See, e.g., Opinion, Scalia’s Blind Justice, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 23, 2004, at 6 (de-
scribing the memorandum as “angry,” “defensive,” and “sarcastic”). 
 234. Cheney, 541 U.S.. at 929. 
 235. Id.  Justice Scalia’s comment about the Sierra Club’s “cruelty” may have been a joke, if a 
bit of a wry one.  My point here is that, whatever Justice Scalia’s actual mental state, the memoran-
dum created the impression that he was angry and defensive. 
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rectly.236  In short, the memorandum is the product of a man who unques-
tionably has a personal stake in the matter and appears angry and defen-
sive. 237   
Justice Scalia is known for his acerbic opinion writing, and thus this 
decision might not be so far from the tone he would take in a dissent.  
But he was oblivious to the impression that such vituperative rhetoric 
creates when employed in defense of his ability to be detached, neutral, 
and impartial. 
V. INCORPORATING TRADITIONAL FORMS OF ADJUDICATION INTO THE 
LAW OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 
A primary goal of judicial disqualification is to promote the appear-
ance of justice and the reputation of the judiciary.  Thus, it is ironic that 
the disqualification process has strayed so far from the traditional forms 
of adjudication that Legal Process theorists, among others, have con-
cluded are essential to maintaining the public’s faith in the decisions of 
unelected judges. 
In this Part, I suggest ways in which the core characteristics of adju-
dication discussed in Part III can be incorporated into the law of 
recusal.238  As I do so, I try to balance the need for procedures that guar-
antee both the appearance and reality that each presiding judge is an im-
partial decisionmaker against concerns for maintaining a speedy and ef-
ficient justice system—qualities that are also necessary to maintain the 
judiciary’s reputation.  In addition, I acknowledge the potential for judge 
shopping, and so reject certain procedures that are likely to be abused.  
Finally, putting theory into practice, I describe how the suggested re-
forms would have changed the way in which the recusal question was 
disclosed and resolved in the Cheney case. 
                                                     
 236. Id. at 923−24. 
 237. For example, Justice Scalia stated that he thought counsel for Sierra Club was being hypo-
critical.  Scalia explained that two days before the brief in opposition to the petition in the case was 
filed, counsel for the Sierra Club wrote to Justice Scalia inviting him to come to speak to one of his 
Stanford Law School classes the following year.  Scalia then pointed out that “[j]udges teaching 
classes at law schools normally have their transportation and expenses paid.”  Id. at 928.  In describ-
ing this incident, Scalia attempted to equate the invitation to lecture at Stanford—a business trip to 
be paid for by Stanford in return for the benefits Stanford students would gain from his visit—with a 
vacation with a litigant that was paid for by that litigant. 
 238. I do not specify whether these reforms should come from Congress or the courts themselves 
because I do not think the source of the obligation is significant. 
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A. Proposals for Reform 
1. Enable Litigants to Frame the Recusal Question 
The recusal laws should be amended to provide a straightforward 
means by which litigants can seek judicial disqualification.  Section 455 
is intended to be self-enforcing, meaning that the recusal issue is sup-
posed to be raised first by the judge and not the parties.  Although it is 
now well established that litigants can file motions to disqualify under  
§ 455, the absence of procedural guidelines for making such a motion 
compounds the awkwardness any litigant encounters in taking that step.  
Accordingly, § 455 should be amended to provide that the parties have a 
right to seek a judge’s recusal by motion filed within an appropriate 
amount of time after obtaining information that suggests that the judge 
could not be impartial or that his impartiality might “reasonably be ques-
tioned.”239  By providing an officially sanctioned method to seek judicial 
disqualification, the law would normalize disqualification and make it 
psychologically easier for lawyers and parties to contemplate asking for 
it. 
In addition, § 455 should be amended to include a mandatory disclo-
sure provision that would require judges to inform the parties of any fi-
nancial interests in the case, personal relationships with litigants or their 
lawyers, or knowledge of the facts of the specific case before them that 
the judge might have.  The disclosure should be required even when a 
judge does not think that the information establishes grounds for her 
recusal.240 
The Ethics in Government Act already requires federal judges, along 
with members of Congress and senior executive branch officials, to file 
financial disclosure reports,241 but those disclosures come too infre-
quently to be of much use to litigants in pending cases.  Disclosures are 
made only on an annual basis, meaning that a trip taken with a litigant 
                                                     
 239. Of course, § 455 should still provide that the judge is free to recuse herself on her own mo-
tion. 
 240. Although not required by federal statute, such disclosure is already encouraged by the 
commentary to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that a “judge should disclose 
on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant 
to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualifica-
tion.”  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 2.12, cmt. 2J (Draft May 2004).  The Model Code is 
not binding, however, and judges frequently have not disclosed facts that they did not think justified 
their recusal.  Indeed, Justice Scalia did not feel obligated to disclose his duck hunting trip with Vice 
President Cheney, and he commented on the trip only after it was reported in newspapers. 
 241. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 4, §§ 101–111 (1996). 
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might not be revealed for months or even a year.  Moreover, anyone 
wishing to obtain a copy of these reports must send a written request to 
the Administrative Office of the Courts, which takes an average of ninety 
days to respond to requests.  In addition, the judge who is the target of 
the request will be informed of the requester’s identity.  As a result, only 
seventy-six members of the public requested these disclosure reports in 
2002.242  Lawyers and litigants explain that they hesitate to request such 
information knowing that their identities will be revealed to the judge 
whom they are investigating.243  The proposal discussed here takes this 
disclosure requirement significantly further by requiring the judge to 
provide directly to litigants in pending cases any information that might 
be considered to have an impact on the judge’s partiality. 
Understandably, judges might object to mandatory disclosure of the 
intimate details of their social lives.  Loss of privacy is indeed a signifi-
cant price to pay, but it is one that most political figures willingly accept 
in return for their positions of authority and public trust.  Judges have no 
more right to total privacy in their personal lives than any other public 
servant.244  And it is important to remember that even under a mandatory 
disclosure regime, judges will not be obligated to report all details of 
their private lives; they will only be required to disclose to the parties in 
cases before them significant extrajudicial contacts with the lawyers or 
parties involved in pending litigation. 
2. Provide for an Impartial Decisionmaker 
The judge who is the subject of a disqualification motion should not 
be placed in the untenable position of deciding that motion.  As a Federal 
Judicial Center report observed, a “judge wishing to remove any doubt 
about his or her objectivity may be tempted to have another judge decide 
the recusal question.”245  Nothing in the law would prevent that.  The 
First Circuit recently commented that “a trial judge faced with a section 
455(a) recusal motion may, in her discretion, leave the motion to a dif-
                                                     
   242.   Joe Stephens, U.S. Judges Getting Disclosure Data Deleted, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2004, at 
A4.  
 243. Id.  Moreover, judges may request redaction of some or all of the material from their finan-
cial disclosure forms on the ground that disclosure would endanger them or their families.  Members 
of Congress and the executive branch do not have this option.  It appears that a significant number of 
judges have made use of this redaction procedure, and most of their requests are granted.  Id.  Judges 
made 661 requests to redact information from financial disclosure reports between 1999 and 2002; 
nearly ninety percent of those requests were granted.  Id. 
 244. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1996) (weighing privacy interest 
against public interest in disclosure). 
 245. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 82, at 44. 
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ferent judge.”246  Yet the court went on to observe that “no reported case 
or accepted principle of law compels [the judge] to do so . . . .”247  Cur-
rently, “the norm” is for “the challenged judge to rule on a recusal mo-
tion.”248 
That practice is unfortunate, and the laws governing judicial dis-
qualification should require that motions to disqualify go to a disinter-
ested judge unless the judge who is the target of the motion agrees to 
recuse himself.249  At the trial court level, this would mean simply refer-
ring the motion to another district court judge.  At the appellate level, the 
motion could be decided by a motions panel made up of three other 
members of that circuit court.  And in the United States Supreme Court, 
the motion should be decided by the other eight Justices. 
Providing for an impartial decisionmaker on the question of recusal 
serves both to prevent actual injustice and the appearance of injustice.  
Ensuring that the decision is made by a neutral decisionmaker would 
protect the integrity of the challenged judge and the judiciary as a whole 
in those cases where disqualification is not justified.250  Even more so, 
referral to a neutral judge would protect the judiciary’s reputation and the 
parties from harm in those rare cases where a judge is so biased in favor 
of one party that, if the decision were his alone, he would choose to re-
main on the case even when he clearly cannot be impartial. 
Transfer is particularly important in cases where the challenged 
judge needs to defend or explain her conduct.  As discussed below, the 
                                                     
 246. In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); accord United 
States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1271–72 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same). 
 247. United States, 158 F.3d at 34. 
 248. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 82, at 44; see, e.g., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. 
FCC, 982 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1992); Chitimacha Tribe of La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 
F.2d 1157, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982); Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Azhocar, 
581 F.2d 735, 737–38 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 249. In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States passed a recommendation that mo-
tions under  § 144 be transferred to a different judge to rule on the sufficiency of the affidavit.  Judi-
cial Conf. of the United States Ann. Rep. 68–69 (1961).  The American Law Institute recently ap-
proved Principles Governing Transnational Civil Procedure.  Rule 10, which was appended to the 
rules though not formally adopted by the ALI, concerns the impartiality of the decisionmaker.  Rule 
10.3 explicitly states that a judge should not be responsible for deciding his or her impartiality: “A 
challenge of a judge must be heard and determined either by a judge other than the one so challenged 
or, if by the challenged judge, under procedures affording immediate appellate review or reconsid-
eration by another judge.” 
 250. A few courts and commentators have expressed the view that transfer of a disqualification 
motion to a neutral decisionmaker would better serve the goal of the statute to promote public confi-
dence in the judicial process.  See Hawaii-Pac. Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 437 F. Supp. 230, 
236 (D. Haw. 1977) (suggesting transfer when the judge thinks “that by [transferring the motion] he 
might better assist in the promotion of public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process”); 
Litteneker, supra note 5, at 265–67 (advocating “transfer in all cases except where the danger of de-
lay and disruption is substantial”). 
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challenged judge should be given an opportunity to refute the chal-
lenger’s allegations or otherwise explain and justify her conduct.251  Yet 
once a judge is in the position of defending herself against a claim of 
bias, she cannot fairly serve as the ultimate decisionmaker on the ques-
tion of whether her explanation is sufficient to justify remaining on the 
case.252 
Some courts have criticized the idea of transferring recusal motions 
to another judge on the grounds that it would be disruptive, and have ex-
pressed the fear that counsel might use such motions strategically to de-
lay proceedings.253  However, transfer to an impartial judge should not 
cause significant delay; any judge addressing the motion would have to 
read the motion papers and issue a final decision on the matter.254  Al-
though the challenged judge would be more familiar with the facts sug-
gesting bias or interest than an impartial judge,255 this familiarity is the 
very reason why the challenged judge should not be permitted to issue 
the final ruling on the motion.  Moreover, as one commentator has noted, 
even if the transferee judge is slower to issue a ruling, a challenger would 
be less likely to appeal a decision not to recuse issued by an impartial 
judge, resulting in an overall speeding-up of the recusal process.256 
A more significant problem with this proposal is that judges might 
not be any more willing to disqualify their colleagues than they are to 
recuse themselves.257  Judges might find it difficult to grant a motion to 
                                                     
 251. See discussion infra Part V.A.3. 
 252. See Commonwealth v. Cherpes, 520 A.2d 439, 446–47 (1987) (relying on previous court 
holdings that a trial judge should recuse if he feels it necessary to explain his conduct). 
 253. See In re Swift, 126 B.R. 725, 728 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (“The law is well-settled that 
the judge whose recusal is sought is ordinarily the judge who rules on the motion, lest such motions 
be used as tools of delay . . . .”); FLAMM, supra note 9, § 17.5.2, at 517–20 (discussing arguments in 
favor of allowing a challenged judge to rule on the motion). 
 254. Certainly, if the motion is granted then proceedings might be delayed while a new judge 
gets up to speed with the facts and background of the case.  The disruption that would arise from 
switching judges is a reason to require that motions to recuse be filed immediately after a party 
learns of facts that would justify disqualification, but it is not grounds for preventing a neutral judge 
from making the decision in the first instance. 
 255. See FLAMM, supra note 9, § 17.5.2, at 518 (noting that some courts have argued that the 
challenged judge should decide a recusal motion because that judge is most familiar with his own 
conduct). 
 256. Bloom, supra note 21, at 697. 
 257. In a survey of state court judges, the judges responded that they would be more likely to 
disqualify themselves than recommend a colleague be disqualified under similar circumstances.  
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 1 (1995).  However, the result of a survey posing a hypo-
thetical recusal situation might not be the best proxy of whether judges are actually willing to recuse 
themselves when they have a potential conflict and are asked to do so by one of the litigants.  In fact, 
the authors of the survey themselves noted that judges reported high levels of ambivalence about 
when to recuse themselves, and recommended that “serious consideration should be given to the 
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disqualify, fearing it would offend a fellow judge.258  Although legiti-
mate, this concern does not outweigh the benefits of transferring the 
recusal decision away from the interested judge.  First, transfer would 
put an end to the worst cases, in which judges insist on presiding even 
when they have an obvious conflict of interest, because even the most re-
spectful of colleagues would have to remove a fellow judge under such 
circumstances.  Second, even if judges are just as reluctant to remove 
colleagues as they are to remove themselves from cases, the simple fact 
that a neutral judge is deciding the issue would create a better public im-
pression than permitting the potentially conflicted judge to decide his 
own fate.  Thus, the appearance of justice will be better served, even if 
the actual rate of recusal remains unchanged. 
In any case, experience shows that judges are willing to risk offend-
ing one another when obligated to pass judgment in the course of fulfill-
ing their judicial duties.  Judges regularly take public positions opposing 
each other’s views.  When judges sit on panels, one judge will often 
write an opinion that conflicts with the decision of the others.  Appellate 
judges frequently reverse lower courts, and en banc courts often reverse 
their own colleagues.  Judges have grown accustomed to these sorts of 
judicial disagreements, and it is reasonable to think that the same profes-
sionalism would allow judges to take on the task of deciding recusal mo-
tions without fear of offending one another.259 
Admittedly, disagreements over the merits of a case are not as per-
sonal, or as sensitive, as requiring a colleague to remove himself from a 
case over his objection.  But these types of decisions do show that judges 
take opposing positions as a regular part of their job and suggest that 
judges would also be capable of making the hard choice to require a col-
league’s recusal were that required of them.  Indeed, appellate courts oc-
casionally order the disqualification of district court judges, even under 
the current deferential standard of review.  For example, a panel of D.C. 
                                                                                                                       
issue of whether to adopt a rule allowing or requiring another judge to pass on disqualification mo-
tions . . . .”  Id. at 2. 
 258. Cf. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 n.12 (1988) (comment-
ing that judges may find it “difficult” to “pass[] upon the integrity of a fellow member of the 
bench”). 
 259. Proof that judges have the stomach for such tasks can be found in their impressive record 
under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.  28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1996).  Studies conducted on 
behalf of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal concluded that chief judges 
take the complaint process seriously and reach the right result in the great majority of cases.  See 
Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Regulate Federal Judges, and How?, 149 F.R.D. 375, 377 (1993) 
(stating that “[a]lthough there are individual cases that cause uneasiness, by and large the results 
look appropriate”); Barr & Willging, supra note 180, at 51 (stating the results of chief judges’ re-
view of complaints). 
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Circuit judges required a district court judge to disqualify himself from 
the highly publicized Microsoft case—a decision that was undoubtedly 
made even harder by the fact that all the judges involved work in the 
same courthouse in Washington, D.C.260  The key is to make the question 
of whether to disqualify a colleague obligatory and standard—part of the 
normal judicial routine—rather than the unusual and ad hoc decision it is 
today.261 
Some commentators have suggested going further than transferring 
just the recusal motion, and have advocated instead for a system of per-
emptory disqualification.262  Under these proposals, the entire case would 
automatically be transferred to a new judge upon the claim that the as-
signed judge is not impartial, without requiring the challenger to prove 
these allegations.  Each party would be given just one opportunity to 
challenge a judge for interest or bias.  Advocates of peremptory disquali-
fication argue that this system ensures that the litigant has an impartial 
judge and avoids the problem of judges being asked to decide their own 
partiality.263 
Peremptory disqualification is less efficient, however, and is more 
prone to abuse than are automatic transfers of just the recusal motion to 
an impartial judge.  Peremptory disqualification slows down the litiga-
tion because a new judge will have to become familiar with the case.  It 
can also serve as a method of judge-shopping, and may be used by liti-
gants to remove judges whose judicial philosophies are hostile to the liti-
gants’ claim.  Finally, automatic transfer does not permit a judge to re-
fute the allegations of bias, and thus may create the public impression 
that more judges are biased, or have conflicts of interest, than is actually 
the case.264  In short, peremptory disqualification might injure the reputa-
tion of the judiciary, thereby undermining the goals of recusal. 
                                                     
 260. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 261. Although it would clearly be awkward for eight Justices to decide whether the ninth should 
be forced to step aside, it is also unseemly for the eight Justices to, in essence, recuse themselves 
from deciding whether their colleague is permitted to sit on a case, necessitating that this question of 
law be decided by the one Justice with a personal stake in the matter. 
 262. See, e.g., Roger M. Baron, A Proposal for the Use of a Judicial Peremptory Challenge Sys-
tem in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 49, 58 (1988); Helena Kempner Kobrin, Comment, Disqualifica-
tion of Federal District Judges—Problems and Proposals, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 612, 633 (1976).  
Several states have enacted peremptory disqualification statutes.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.  
§ 22.20.022 (Michie 2004); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (Supp. 2005). 
 263. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 262; Kobrin, supra note 262. 
 264. FLAMM, supra note 9, §§ 3.4–3.5, at 62–66. 
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3. Encourage the Challenged Judge to Respond to a Motion to 
Disqualify 
In conjunction with the requirement that a recusal motion be trans-
ferred to an impartial judge, § 455 should be amended to provide that the 
challenged judge be encouraged to file evidence refuting facts asserted in 
the recusal motion, and perhaps also an explanation of why disqualifica-
tion is not justified.  As described above, most motions to disqualify are 
filed by one party and are not responded to by the other, depriving the 
judge of the benefit of an adversarial presentation of the issue.  The chal-
lenged judge is the most natural party to respond to a motion to disqual-
ify.  He will be familiar with the facts cited by the moving party and is 
best able to put those facts in context for the decisionmaker.  Indeed, the 
judge will likely do a far better job of responding to the motion than the 
other litigants, who may not have any knowledge of the circumstances 
that inspired the motion in the first place. 
In the past, a handful of judges have responded to disqualification 
motions by including in the record refutation of the evidence against 
them.  In McGuire v. Blount,265 for example, the plaintiffs filed a motion 
asking the judge to recuse himself on the ground that the judge’s wife 
had acquired an interest in the property that was the very subject of the 
litigation.  The plaintiffs did not provide a sworn affidavit or any other 
evidence to support this claim.  The judge denied the motion, stating that 
his wife had no interest in the property.  But he noted for the record that 
she had been offered the deed to the property, which she had declined to 
accept.  The judge then took the precaution of placing in the file an affi-
davit of a real estate agent attesting to these facts.266  The Supreme Court 
cited approvingly to the judge’s inclusion of an affidavit supporting his 
version of the events, noted there was no evidence to refute it, and re-
fused to require that the judge recuse himself.267 
More recently, in United States v. Morrison,268 the Second Circuit 
reviewed the district court judge’s refusal to recuse herself after investi-
gating the facts underlying a recusal motion.  The defendant sought to 
disqualify the district court judge based on an alleged adverse business 
relationship between the defendant, the judge’s husband, and a friend of 
the judge’s.  The judge asked her husband and the friend to review the 
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materials submitted with the defendant’s motion.  They both responded 
that the allegations were false and denied any relationship with the de-
fendant.  The judge then declined to recuse herself.  Reviewing the pro-
cedure, the Second Circuit stated “it was not irregular for [the judge] to 
ascertain her husband’s and friend’s possible involvement with the de-
fendant simply by asking them, in a reasonable effort to confirm that [de-
fendant’s] incredible claims were indeed not factual.”269 
Thus, although judges typically do not provide evidence to refute a 
motion to disqualify, reviewing courts have commented favorably on the 
practice in the rare cases when they have done so.  Responses by the 
challenged judge might become more common if recusal motions were 
routinely referred to neutral judges, which would then free the chal-
lenged judge to defend her conduct with the knowledge that a neutral 
third party would ultimately decide the matter. 
4. Require Judges to Give Reasoned Explanations for Recusal 
Decisions 
Too often, judges recuse themselves without any explanation of why 
they are choosing to do so.  Judges might feel that it is unnecessary to 
announce their reasons for voluntarily bowing out, and the parties in 
those cases usually have no interest, and certainly have no right, to insist 
that the judge explain herself.  In contrast, judges who refuse to recuse 
themselves are much more likely to publish an opinion explaining why.  
Thus, the body of law supporting the decision to remain on a case in the 
face of a potential conflict outweighs the minimal precedent explaining 
when a judge should step aside. 
To alleviate this problem, judges should give reasons for deciding to 
remove themselves (or, if the motion is transferred to a new judge, that 
judge should articulate the basis for his decision).  The explanations need 
not be long or detailed, particularly in straightforward cases.  These deci-
sions will fill the void left by silent recusals, especially in cases where a 
judge decides to step down merely because his impartiality might “rea-
sonably be questioned,” and not because that judge thinks he is biased or 
incapable of acting as a neutral decisionmaker.  Decisions articulating 
grounds for recusal will provide a body of precedent to guide judges fac-
ing such decisions in the future.270  If nothing else, a judge considering 
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disqualification will get a clearer sense of how often his colleagues have 
made the choice to step aside (or to require a colleague to step aside), 
making it psychologically easier for a judge to take the same course of 
action. 
B. Putting Theory Into Practice: The Effect of the Proposed Reforms on 
the Cheney Case 
Applying these suggested reforms to the Cheney case demonstrates 
that, if the traditional elements of adjudication were incorporated into 
recusal law, those laws would better serve the purpose of protecting the 
reputation of the judiciary. 
Under the proposals discussed above, Justice Scalia would have been 
obligated to disclose the fact that he took the trip with Cheney before the 
press reported it.  If the information had initially come from the Justice 
himself, rather than the media, it might have softened the public impres-
sion of the incident.  Rather than a piece of investigative journalism, the 
story would have been billed as a routine public disclosure by a Justice.  
Although still newsworthy, the information would have been less likely 
to convey the impression of impropriety than articles trumpeting a here-
tofore “secret” vacation between a litigant and a Justice. 
Furthermore, immediate and full disclosure of important details of 
the trip—such as the timing of the invitation and its acceptance, the 
number of guests who attended, and the travel arrangements—would 
have given the public a more complete picture of the trip and might have 
forestalled some of the criticism.  Justice Scalia could have made clear 
from the outset that he and his family members did not benefit finan-
cially from flying on Air Force Two—an important fact needed to 
counter the reasonable assumption that they saved themselves the cost of 
a flight by traveling with the Vice President.  He could also have clari-
fied for the parties and the press that he was never alone with Cheney 
during the trip, which would have prevented editorialists from speculat-
ing that he had hours of private time with the Vice President in which to 
discuss the case.271 
This type of information is relevant to the question of whether a Jus-
tice should recuse him or herself after vacationing with a litigant, and 
thus is properly subject to a public disclosure requirement.  Justice Scalia 
implicitly acknowledged as much when he discussed these details in his 
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defense of the propriety of the trip.272  The reputation of the judiciary 
would have been better protected had this information been disclosed up 
front, before the press reported on the matter and certainly before the Si-
erra Club sought his removal from the case.  Indeed, if Justice Scalia had 
disclosed that information in advance, it is possible that the Sierra Club 
would never have sought his removal from the case. 
In his memorandum decision, Justice Scalia staunchly defended what 
he described as the “well-known and constant practice of Justices’ enjoy-
ing friendship and social intercourse with Members of Congress and of-
ficers of the Executive Branch.”273  The disclosure requirement proposed 
in this Article may serve to discourage such social contact.  A judge 
might think twice before socializing with a litigant if she realizes she will 
have to disclose the details of that event to the parties, and some judges 
might choose to curtail such socialization with litigants whose cases are 
pending before them.  But those who, like Justice Scalia, feel strongly 
that they should be permitted to engage in such social contact would be 
free to do so under this Article’s proposal as long as they fully disclosed 
the information about any social engagements with litigants in pending 
cases. 
The goal of promoting the appearance of justice would also have 
been better served if the other eight Justices had decided whether Justice 
Scalia should sit on the case, rather than leaving the decision to Justice 
Scalia himself.  No matter how reasonable, well written, and persuasive 
his memorandum decision might be, it is tainted because the author had a 
personal stake in the matter.  There is something odd about a Supreme 
Court pronouncement on a question of law that so prominently features 
the pronoun “I.”  The memorandum decision is argumentative, personal, 
and a little defensive.  It reads more like an opposing motion filed by a 
party than an opinion by a neutral decisionmaker.274  In short, the very 
authority of the decision is undermined by the fact that its author is seek-
ing to justify his own conduct. 
Had the other eight Justices addressed the question of whether Jus-
tice Scalia should recuse himself, the decision would undoubtedly have 
been better received because it would have reflected the views of a ma-
jority of the Court and not a single, self-interested Justice.  Even if the 
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whole Court had agreed with Scalia that he need not recuse himself, an 
opinion authored by one of the other Justices would likely have been 
more moderate in tone, would have taken fewer opportunities to attack 
Scalia’s critics, and would not have made such strident statements about 
the need to ensure that judges are free to socialize with other high rank-
ing members of government.  Both symbolically and substantively, the 
final decision about whether Scalia should be disqualified would have 
been improved had it come from the full Court, and would have better 
served the goal of protecting the Court’s reputation.  For these same rea-
sons, all recusal decisions would benefit from the procedural reforms 
suggested in this Article. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As is clear from the long history of controversy surrounding judicial 
recusal, including the recent attention given to Justice Scalia’s refusal to 
recuse himself from the Cheney case, the law of judicial disqualification 
has failed to protect the integrity of the judiciary.  Almost every com-
mentator discussing problems with the disqualification laws has recom-
mended expanding the grounds for judicial recusals.275  But the history of 
judicial disqualification demonstrates that alterations to the substantive 
standard will do little good as long as members of the judiciary are re-
sponsible for construing and applying the disqualification laws to them-
selves.  Moreover, it would be wrong to lower the substantive standards 
for disqualification so far as to force judges to withdraw from cases sim-
ply because the majority of editorial writers or political pundits suggest 
that they do so. 
The solution I propose instead is to incorporate the traditional forms 
of adjudication into the recusal process.  The basic procedural compo-
nents of litigation—party presentation of disputes to an impartial deci-
sionmaker who issues a reasoned decision based on an identifiable body 
of law—have long been valued as essential to ensuring accurate results 
of adjudication and, most important here, maintaining the legitimacy of 
the judiciary.  Legal Process theorists cited these practices as a defense to 
Legal Realists’ attacks on judicial lawmaking, assuming that most of us 
would accept the legitimacy of decisions made in accordance with these 
traditional forms that cabin judicial discretion and promote the accuracy 
of the final result.  The traditional adjudicatory model lauded by Legal 
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Process theorists fifty years ago continues to be cited today by scholars 
describing the sources of legitimacy for judicial decisionmaking.  Incor-
porating these traditional forms of adjudication into the law of judicial 
disqualification will do more to protect judicial integrity than any change 
to the substantive recusal standards can accomplish. 
